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Abstract/Zusammenfassung/Résumé 
 
 
With the current attention given to climate change and global warming, the issue of “environmental 
security” is back high on the agenda of the international community. Environmental degradation is 
increasingly considered as a potential cause for the (re-)emergence of violent conflicts due to 
shrinking natural resources such as drinkable water and land. However, research on the issue has 
shown that there is very little empirical evidence of a direct causal link between environmental 
degradation and violent conflict. In order to set effective priorities for environmental peacebuilding, 
it is important to understand - particularly in situations of environmental stress - how natural 
resource conflicts are embedded in social and political dynamics, how they are managed by local 
institutions, and how these institutional arrangements can be supported through outside 
intervention. Based on a research project conducted by swisspeace within the framework of the 
NCCR North-South, the swisspeace annual conference 2007 explored those complex linkages and 
formulated entry points for improving intervention strategies by external actors. 
Dank der wachsenden Aufmerksamkeit gegenüber Klimawandel und -erwärmung ist das Thema 
„Umweltsicherheit“ hoch auf der Agenda der internationalen Gemeinschaft anzutreffen. 
Umweltzerstörung und die dadurch knapp gewordenen natürlichen Ressourcen werden zunehmend 
als mögliche Ursache für das (Wieder)aufflammen von Konflikten betrachtet. Forschungen haben 
jedoch ergeben, dass es noch wenig empirische Beweise für einen direkten kausalen Zusammenhang 
zwischen Umweltzerstörung und Gewaltkonflikten gibt. Um Prioritäten in der Friedensförderung im 
Bereich Umwelt zu setzen, ist es wichtig zu verstehen, wie Konflikte um natürliche Ressourcen im 
sozialen und politischen Kontext eingebettet sind, wie lokale Institutionen diese Konflikte 
bewältigen und wie sie dabei von aussen unterstützt werden können. Aufgrund eines 
Forschungsprojektes von swisspeace im Rahmen des NCCR North-South hat sich die swisspeace 
Jahreskonferenz 2007 mit diesen komplexen Zusammenhängen auseinandergesetzt und mögliche 
Interventionsstrategien für aussenstehende Akteure formuliert. 
Dans la foulée des débats actuels sur le changement climatique, le concept de “sécurité 
environnementale“ a fait son retour sur le devant de la scène internationale. La dégradation de 
l’environnement est en effet de plus en plus considérée comme une cause potentielle de conflits 
violents autour de l’accès à des ressources en diminution telles que l’eau potable et la terre. 
Pourtant, la recherche sur ces questions a montré que les preuves empiriques d’un lien direct entre la 
dégradation de l’environnement et le déclenchement de conflits sont inexistantes. Si l’on veut faire 
les bons choix en matière de promotion de la paix dans le domaine de l’environnement, il est 
impératif de comprendre comment, en particulier là où l’environnement représente un facteur 
éventuel de tension, les conflits autour des ressources naturelles s’inscrivent dans des dynamiques 
sociales et politiques, de voir quelles sont les institutions qui tentent de gérer ces conflits au niveau 
local, et d’analyser la façon dont ces institutions peuvent être soutenues de l’extérieur. Sur la base 
des résultats d’un projet de recherche mené à swisspeace dans le cadre du NCCR North-South, c’est 
sur l’analyse de ces liens complexes et sur la façon dont les stratégies d’intervention de l’extérieur 
pourraient être améliorées que s’est penchée la conférence annuelle 2007 de swisspeace. 
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Introduction 
Didier Péclard1 
 
With the current attention given to climate change and global warming, the issue of “environmental 
security” is back high on the agenda of the international community. Indeed, environmental 
degradation is usually considered, in the climate change scenarios, as a potential cause for the  
(re-)emergence of violent conflicts due to shrinking natural resources such as drinkable water and 
land. As a recent report of the German Advisory Council on Global Change recently put it, “climate 
change will overstretch many societies’ adaptive capacities within the coming decades”, and this 
“could result in destabilization and violence, jeopardizing national and international security to a 
new degree” (WBGU 2008: 1). 
If it has gained renewed salience, the issue is not new. It is towards the end of the Cold War that the 
environment started to be considered as a potential threat to international security in the wake of 
ecological disasters such as the Tchernobyl 1986 nuclear accident, drought and desertification in the 
Sahel belt or debates in Western Europe about the possible death of forests. Reflection and research 
on how to ensure the security of states moved from an exclusive concern with protection against 
nuclear weapons to the protection of the environment itself. 
Since then, a number of research programmes have been launched in order to study and, if possible, 
“measure” the links between environmental degradation and the occurrence of violent conflicts 
worldwide. This was the case, for instance, of Thomas Homer-Dixon with his Canada-based team 
(Homer Dixon 1994; 1999) and the Environment and Conflict Project (ENCOP) led by Günther 
Baechler and Kurt Spillmann (Baechler 1994; 1998). The two teams differed in their theoretical 
backgrounds and terminology. However, they both tried, on the basis of aggregated empirical 
evidence from a number of case studies, to establish causal links between environmental 
degradation, increased scarcity in renewable natural resources and the occurrence of violent 
conflicts, with particular focus on developing and transition countries. 
Both groups came to comparable conclusions, showing that scarcity and environmental degradation 
alone were rarely a direct cause of violent conflicts. But both also added that environmental 
degradation combined with other triggering factors such as socio-economic, ethnic or social 
inequalities could, and in many cases did, contribute to such conflicts.2 In other words, a consensus 
was gradually reached around the idea that conflicts linked to renewable natural resources such as 
land and water could not be traced back to a single explanatory factor such as environmental 
degradation, and that they depended on a plurality of social, political, economic and environmental 
factors. Over a decade after most of these early studies were published, the link between 
environmental degradation and conflict remains as elusive and difficult to ascertain on the basis of 
empirical evidence despite widespread claims to the contrary present in popular discourse, in the 
media as well as in scientifically based publications such as the latest report of the International 
Panel on Climate Change (Gleditsch & Nordås 2009; Breitmeier 2009). 
 
 
 
______________________ 
1   Senior researcher, swisspeace and NCCR North-South. The editor of this conference paper would like to acknowledge the 
support of the NCCR North-South for much of the research work that made it possible. 
2   See Hagmann 2005 and Breitmeier 2009 for critical reflections on the two research programmes. 
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It is on this historiographical basis that a research project on environmental conflict was elaborated 
as of 2001 at swisspeace within the framework of the National Centre of Competence in Research 
(NCCR North-South).3 Rather than re-opening the debate about the causality between natural 
resources and conflict, the programme set out to understand and analyse how, in situations of 
environmental stress, potential conflicts around natural resources were managed by local and 
international actors (Goetschel and Péclard 2006). To do so a shift in perspective “from 
environmentally induced conflicts to natural resource-use conflicts” was suggested (Hagmann 2005: 
21). This implied that issues such as scarcity and environmental degradation had to be analysed (1) 
in the context of social and political relations between the concerned user groups, (2) in relation to 
the role of institutions set up to manage resource use patterns and (3) by taking into account the 
social and cultural rationale of groups involved in natural resource management and/or conflicts 
(ibid: 21-22). 
The aim of the 2007 swisspeace annual conference upon which this publication is based was to 
share some of the main results of the NCCR North-South research programme on environmental 
conflicts with other scholars and with practitioners in order to: 
• explore the linkages between (renewable) natural resource and conflict management in 
developing countries by reference to global environmental change as well as current 
resource and environmental management practices both within and outside of 
development cooperation; 
• provide insights into the challenges and best practices of the peaceful management of key 
renewable natural resources in different parts of the world; 
• foster exchange between researchers and practitioners in achieving a more holistic 
understanding of the complexities of ‘environmental peacebuilding’ by different sets of 
actors; 
• formulate entry points for improving current intervention strategies by external actors as 
well as entry points for innovative future research in the realm of environmental conflict 
and resource management. 
The present swisspeace conference paper takes up some of these points from both a research and a 
practice-oriented perspective. 
In his opening contribution, Simon Dalby proposes a critical overview of twenty years of debate on 
“peacebuilding and environmental security” since the Report of the Brundtland Commission on 
“Our Common Future” was released in 1987. Arguing that we now live in a new ecological era, the 
Anthropocene, “where we are actively remaking an environment that can no longer be considered 
separate from human actions” he warns that the discussion on environment causing conflict has 
“come full circle” back to where it started, and that therefore “we have to think very carefully about 
the appropriate contexts in which we should consider environment and conflict in order to get 
priorities for peacebuilding right”. He draws four main lessons from earlier debates and argues that 
there is a need to (1) think and work in an interdisciplinary manner; (2) take account of the crucial 
role played by the local contexts in which insecurity and violent conflicts play out; (3) give due 
attention to the institutional set up within which policy responses are conceived; and (4) link up 
conflicts at the local level with global discussions on environmental change. 
 
______________________ 
3   See www.north-south.unibe.ch. 
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The relationships between local conflict settings and global debates, as well as the key role of 
institutions are also central to the research results presented here by three former PhD students 
within the “environmental conflict” programme of the NCCR North-South.4 Drawing from his 
research on conflict management dynamics in pastoral societies of East African lowlands, Tobias 
Hagmann makes a strong case against reductionist analyses of and intervention in violent conflicts 
in contexts of competition over natural resources. “Herders”, he argues, “do not simply fight over 
the desert because they are animated by subsistence need, but because they pursue politically, 
culturally and economically rational agendas” that have as much to do with access to land and 
water as to “competition over urban real estate, multi-party elections and state budget.” 
In her article on disputes over water in the Ferghana Valley, a region considered by many as a 
“flashpoint of conflicts” in Central Asia, Christine Bichsel looks at the conflict transformation 
programmes of three international aid agencies (SDC, Mercy Corps and UNDP). Focusing on the 
social, cultural and political dimensions of these conflicts, she argues that the agencies “do not pay 
enough attention to the issue of power in natural resource conflict management”. It is the very 
understanding of the root causes of conflict that is at stake here. Because these agencies see conflict 
as “endemic to the local context” and as the result of competition over scarce resources between 
ethnically homogeneous communities, they develop inappropriate conflict transformation strategies. 
Indeed, scarcity is not just an observable reality; it is also a social and cultural construct, based on 
the historical dynamics of power relations between groups and communities, and this dimension 
needs to be taken into account in mitigation strategies rather than imposing normative views on 
social change and harmony. 
From an econometric perspective, Moges Shiferaw also strongly argues in favour of an approach 
that takes social relations into account. In his analysis of property rights reform in the water sector in 
Ethiopia, he indeed shows that the key to solving dispute over water property rights is “to get the 
relationship among water sharing parties right” rather than simply focusing on property rights 
themselves. Equity should be taken into account, not only efficiency. 
With the last two contributions, the focus shifts from academic research to experiences from 
practitioners, firstly at the very local level, and then from a global vantage point. In his paper, Aly 
Dama from the Swiss NGO Helvetas Mali, presents results and lessons learnt from a programme for 
the prevention and management of natural resources conflicts in the Malian Sahel. Based on two 
concrete example, the paper shows that, if conflicts between groups relying on different production 
systems for their livelihoods (e.g. herders vs. farmers) as well as intra-groups conflicts tend to 
increase and escalate after periods of severe drought, climatic conditions are by far not the only 
factor contributing to violent actions. More importantly maybe, the example of Mali shows how 
conflict prevention and transformation mechanisms at the local level can be a very efficient tool 
provided local communities and their leaders are given “the competences to negotiate agreements 
with other groups and with the government”, and provided “the negotiated solutions are confirmed 
on a legal level”. In such a context, the role of the state would lie in “the definition of a general 
framework, leaving the concrete implementation to local authorities in charge of regulation and 
social stability.” 
As Simon Dalby argues in his contribution, it is crucial for environmental peacebuilding strategies to 
link local conflicts with global dynamics of climate change. This is why this volume ends on a 
contribution by Peter Maurer, Swiss Ambassador to the United Nations, on Switzerland, the UN and 
environmental peacebuilding. He notes that, while environment and security issues have both had 
positive  developments  within  the  UN  system,  “the  focus on  linkages  between  them  is  far less  
 
______________________ 
4   For a full list of the PhD theses written as part of the programme see Annex 1. 
  Environmental Peacebuilding 
 7 
 
pronounced than the nexus between environment and development.” In order to bridge this gap, he 
argues, the question needs to be addressed at the conceptual, operational and governance levels, 
while information sharing on environment and conflict must be improved and new peacebuilding 
instruments developed based on renewed global partnerships. The UN is well suited to take up these 
issues, but for this to happen the environmental pillar within it will have to be strengthened, and the 
doubts of a number of UN members regarding this overcome. This is a task that Switzerland has 
taken up at the political and operational levels, even though the prospects for success look dire. 
There is little doubt, unfortunately, that the severe consequences of climate change foreseen by 
experts of the IPCC and other research bodies - such as shrinking drinkable water resources, rising 
sea level and protracted drought periods - will put severe stress on many societies, especially in the 
‘Global South’. But, as the research results presented in this volume clearly show, the challenge for 
environmental peacebuilding is to avoid drawing strategies based on a reductionist understanding of 
what we defined here as natural resources use conflicts. This means essentially three things: (1) take 
full account of the inherently political nature of violent conflict; (2) pay due attention to the 
institutional mechanisms of conflict prevention in the concerned societies and devise strategies in 
order to reinforce them; (3) see these conflicts as part of wider processes of social and political 
change both at the local and global levels. 
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1  Peacebuilding and Environmental Security  
in the Anthropocene 
Simon Dalby5 
 
1.1 Twenty Years of Environmental Security 
On the twentieth anniversary of the publication of the Brundtland Commission's report on "Our 
Common Future" in 1987 it is worth reflecting back on the intellectual trajectory of the debate about 
environmental security to see how the discussion has changed and why. While the geopolitical 
circumstances have changed substantially, geopolitical considerations do continue to shape both the 
academic and the policy debate on sustainable development and its relation to conflict and peace. 
Over the last two decades discussions of security and the emergence of both critical scholarship 
which challenges the taken for granted assumptions in security thinking, and the parallel policy 
discussions of human security have likewise shifted how these issues are understood and how 
peacebuilding might now be considered. 
More recently climate change and earth system science have begun to change commonly held 
assumptions about environment. The sheer scale of human activities now means that we are living 
in a new geological era, the Anthropocene, where we are actively remaking an environment that can 
no longer be considered separate from human actions (Flannery 2006). Hence rethinking both 
security and environment are necessary in addition to connecting these themes with renewed 
concerns about resource wars. All of which suggests both how we ask questions about peace, 
nature, conflict, and how we make policies to deal with dangers and build peace, need to be 
updated and adapted to be appropriate in the new circumstances. 
The initial formulations of sustainable development in the 1980s were codified by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (1987), but nearly taken for granted in the document 
is the assumption that violence is likely in imminent struggles for access to scarce resources. And at 
least implicit in much of the discussion is the argument that renewable resources are a key part of 
this problem, and that such shortages will likely be aggravated by environmental degradation of 
various sorts. This line of argument fed the initial formulations of what became the discourse of 
environmental security, and has continued to shape many of the discussions since. 
The second stream of thinking that fed into the discussion was the "rethinking security" debate at 
the end of the cold war; if the Soviet Union was no longer a threat to the West then what else might 
be? Among the many contenders were ethnic nationalism, migration, drugs, loose nukes, diseases, 
and the global environment (Klare and Chandrani 1998). Concerns about ozone holes and climate 
change raised questions of global warfare over such issues in the future. These two key questions, 
first the empirical one concerning if and when environmental changes might cause conflicts where 
and how, and the second one concerning the appropriate policy responses to these conflicts which 
are understood to have security implications in many disparate ways, structured the debate through 
much of the 1990s. 
In early years of the current decade this whole discussion got effectively turned upside down when 
the "greed not grievance" arguments suggested that abundance rather than scarcity was related to 
violence in the "new wars" of the 1990s (de Soysa 2002). Here the suggestion is that resources that 
are worth fighting for when few other economic options are available are the source of organized 
violence. One fights to control revenue from natural resources if one has few other options. Thus the 
discussion of conflict diamonds, the violence surrounding oil resources in many places and the 
destruction of  tropical forests to support insurgencies, suggested a  very different set of  circumstan-  
 
______________________ 
5  Professor, Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa. 
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ces relating to conflict, and more directly tied concerns with violence in the peripheries into 
discussions of consumption in the metropoles of the global economy (Le Billon 2005). 
The environmental security and resource wars discussion has also been partly eclipsed by the 
discussion of global resource issues, and petroleum geopolitics in particular in the aftermath of the 
American invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Klare 2004). This in turn has fed into a renewed concern with 
popular discussions of "peak oil" and the relationship between American imperial actions in South 
West Asia connect to discussions of the implications of consumption and security of supply for the 
American polity in particular, and the global economy more generally (Kuntsler 2006). It would 
appear that the resource war arguments are playing out at a much larger scale in the case of 
petroleum and American global security policy (Bacevich 2005). 
But in 2007 once again the environment re-entered the discussion at the largest of scales. It is now 
indisputable that the by product of this "carboniferous capitalism" is literally changing the planet's 
air and inducing climate changes that will in turn render many people, in particular the poor in the 
global South, vulnerable to environmental disruptions (Flannery 2006). Thus over the last two 
decades as the growing recognition of the scale of human activities has lead to the recognition that 
we are effectively living in "the Anthropocene", the discussion has come full circle, back to where 
the argument of environment causing conflict started. But it adds an important additional point; we 
have to think very carefully about the appropriate contexts in which we should consider environment 
and conflict in order to get priorities for peacebuilding right. Thinking through this history of 
environmental security raises the simple but important matter of what lessons can be drawn from 
the larger theoretical reflections. 
At least four crucial lessons seem to need emphasis although all four are very difficult to encapsulate 
concisely. 
One crucial lesson is disciplinary; lessons that are drawn tend to follow from what questions are 
asked, and these in turn are premised on the disciplinary training of those asking the questions. 
Economists concerned with global comparisons and national development statistics don't pose 
similar questions to political scientists interested in war causation. Neither discipline is much 
concerned with detailed fieldwork in conflict zones. 
The second lesson concerns questions of how the social, economic and physical locales in which 
insecurities happen shape both the patterns of violence and the opportunities for peacebuilding. The 
critical literature in security studies is especially relevant here because it focuses attention on who 
specifies threats, and how identities are mobilized in a crisis in ways that are then "securitized" 
(Fierke 2007). 
This is related to a third lesson, or more precisely the institutional context within which policy 
questions are formulated. Quite how the problems of environment and conflict are posed is related 
to the policy prescriptions and the institutions empowered and funded to act. Whether 
environmental difficulties are understood as matters of development, conflict, human security or part 
of the war on terror matters in terms of likely policy responses. 
But these discussions too are overshadowed now by the fourth lesson concerning the need to feed 
all the smaller scale conflict discussions, and the debate about resources, scarcity, development and 
peacemaking back into the larger concerns with global environmental change. 
1.2 Disciplines and Discourse 
The discussions over the last couple of decades about conflict and environment have at times been 
rancorous, sometimes humourous, but have rarely come to widely agreed consensus on core themes. 
This is not  the place  to rehearse once again the history of all this (see Dalby 2007a), but some  brief  
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comments are necessary. The initial premise of the WCED (1987) that environmental degradation 
would cause conflict was widely accepted among the commentators at the time. What is notable 
about Thomas Homer-Dixon's (1991) intervention in the early 1990s is that he for one did not accept 
the basic premise and turned from a wide ranging policy discussion to try some detailed empirical 
work that would establish the parameters of how environmental change might be a problem, and 
specifically how it might lead to what he called acute conflict. Simultaneously Daniel Deudney 
(1990) was making the case that linking environment to the then conventional understandings of 
security was likewise not necessarily a good idea given that the military in particular was not an 
appropriate institution to do environmental projects. Much of the subsequent discussion has 
followed from these initial points. 
The initial complaints by Nils Petter Gleditsch (1998) in particular about the discussion of 
environment and conflict focused on war, something that Homer-Dixon (1994) had suggested was 
unlikely to be caused by environmental change, but was still in the larger discussions as a matter of 
concern. Geographers who work in the field of what has become known as political ecology were 
annoyed that Homer-Dixon's analysis apparently ignored their contribution and the sheer complexity 
of the relationships between environment and violence in many places (Peluso and Watts 2001). But 
the failure to speak across disciplines has not gone away in the intervening years. A recent case in 
point is the appearance of a comprehensive paper in the prestigious Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers on land wars and Brazil which doesn't cite the peace research literature on 
resource wars, much of which at least appears to be relevant to the conflict in the south of Para 
(Simmons et al. 2007). These difficulties or these failures of cross disciplinary dialogue remain; they 
don't help in generating appropriate peacebuilding policy discussion. Hence scholarly research 
simply doesn't generate an obvious policy agenda. 
Economists and political scientists concerned with national data sets as the empirical source for 
discussions of war and conflict focused on resources and exports rather than environments and not 
surprisingly ended up suggesting the importance of these factors in causing conflict. All these 
debates continue to this day suggesting both the complexity of matters under investigation, and 
clearly that different disciplines explain things in different ways which may not be compatible (Korf 
2006). What is not clear is why any particular discipline might be understood to have a monopoly of 
wisdom on any of these matters. Hence key questions are still very open to disciplinary 
interpretations which are likely to come to divergent conclusions, not least because their initial 
assumptions are so different. 
The matter is not solved by the addition of multiple disciplines because both what is deemed an 
appropriate method is not clear, neither is there agreement on what counts for evidence given 
different notions of both conflict and environment, not to mention resources and scarcity. The timing 
of the initiation of violent conflicts is also key, and the duration once they start too (Korf 2005). 
Where migration of animals is involved, as it is in places in Africa in particular conflict between 
herders and pastoralists may be a seasonal matter as different modes of extracting a living collide at 
particular times (Baechler 1999). These matters are not likely to be caught in national scale 
economic statistics that are grist for the economist's mill. But in turn the micro level analysis of rural 
sociology and geography may not integrate the local well with larger global economic changes that 
determine matters of price and market access for local production (de Soysa 2002). 
It was precisely such complexities that led scholars involved in the NATO investigations of these 
matters in the late 1990s to pose a whole series of syndromes of change to try to encapsulate the 
multiple variations of environmental change that might cause conflict (Lietzmann and Vest, 1999). It 
is likewise crucial to recognize that different circumstances produce different modes of conflict, and 
the social organizations and cultural logics of particular peoples are key to understanding where 
conflict might arise, the circumstances in which it persists and the possibilities for conflict resolution 
(Suliman 1999). It also suggests very clearly that whether conflict turns violent or not is a matter 
related to institutions and the possibility of adaptation, negotiation and mitigation in a crisis.  
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Lessons from one case may be transferable but the specific contexts may preclude this; empirical 
investigation of particular cases is needed. 
In parallel with all this discussion of security in the 1990s the literature on environment too had 
challenged the assumptions of environmental degradation as the starting point for discussion. The 
burgeoning field of political ecology in particular made it clear that blaming rural ignorance and bad 
management practices for environmental problems was at least misleading in most cases (Peluso 
and Watts 2001). The case of the failure of either the Chinese or Indian states to incorporate new 
approaches into thinking about the Himalayan region in the aftermath of the realization that earlier 
arguments about the causes of erosion in the mountains were seriously misleading, illustrates that 
scholarly research is not enough to get policy agendas to change (Blaikie and Muldavin 2004). 
Political discourses drive policy, in these cases much more so than the academic research that 
disputes the assumptions in the policy formulation. 
Overarching this is the question of political power, and the ability of elites to use it to further their 
ends, not all of which are necessarily peaceful. Civil wars are often tied into the political economy of 
resource extraction (Ross 2004). At the heart of Thomas Homer-Dixon's (1999) analysis is an 
important point related to structural scarcity; in a crisis elites may often act to enhance their control 
over contested resources and are frequently willing to use violence to accomplish change. In short 
the whole Malthusian assumption of scarcity causing violence is not a tenable premise for serious 
scholarship, nor for much policy advice; the actions of state elites are frequently more important 
than rural shortages (Kahl 2006). This in and of itself might not seem to be a particularly helpful 
insight, but in fact, given the propensity for policy institutions to reinvent Malthusian arguments 
every few years, and portray the poor and dispossessed as a security threat to modernity, the point is 
actually of very considerable importance. 
1.3 Contexts and Scale 
At the largest scale this point is in some ways clearest. The global resource conflicts that are 
frequently invoked are mostly about oil these days, and seem likely to be about oil for the 
foreseeable future. They are obviously about the situation in the Persian Gulf, and in South West 
Asia in general. They are about old patterns of geopolitical rivalry, about the persistent attempt on 
the part of the American elites to use military force to control the trade in oil in the region (Klare, 
2004, Bacevich 2005). The efforts to find new sources of oil, and the persistent rivalries over 
controlling supplies and the huge profits to be had from oil when the price is high, have focused 
attention once again on Africa as a source of raw materials for the global economy, and suggests 
one more "scramble for Africa" is currently underway (Carmody and Owusu 2007). 
The Pentagon is once again rearranging the global commander's map of the world and is in the 
process of activating "AFRICOM"; Washington is paying attention. But none of that suggests that a 
global war for resources is being fought as such, at least not yet. Even if the American military 
launches the much anticipated air assault on Iran in the near future it may not amount to such a 
war. Although the ability to control the flow of petroleum to Asia is undoubtedly a key component in 
strategic thinking in Washington where China is understood to be an emerging geopolitical 
competitor. The ability to even realistically threaten to cut off fuel supplies in a crisis could give 
Washington a very important leverage in the future. 
But oil isn't about scarcity at the margins; it isn't about violence caused by shortages but about 
control over an abundant resource that is the key to so much in the global economy. The global 
economy spreads such conflicts across national boundaries so impacts of consumption in one place 
are frequently displaced into other states and regions in a global economy of resource supplies 
(Simpson 2007). It may be about control over the global trade and about who controls access to the 
particular sources of supply, but this is not a resource that the marginalized peasantry of the third 
world are directly fighting over. 
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On the smaller scale it is frequently the rural poor in many places that find themselves in the way 
when large energy projects are set in motion to fuel that global economy. In so far as they resist they 
too can be considered part of the relationship between environment and conflict but once again it is 
not about scarcity or environmental resources, rather it is about their being in the wrong place as far 
as development is concerned (Gedicks 2001). Where violence occurs in struggles over the impacts of 
"development projects" it is also worth noting that the conflicts in many cases may be about 
arguments over compensation for the disruptions of traditional livelihoods at least as much as direct 
opposition to the "development" (Walton and Barnett 2008), an important point that might be most 
useful for at least some peacebuilding policy initiatives. 
This point might become especially important in the coming years if biofuels are promoted as the 
solution to both oil dependence and greenhouse gas emissions, and this in turn further accelerates 
the spread of large scale industrial agriculture that displaces subsistence farmers and small scale 
producers. But how such conflicts play out, and the crucial matter of how they might turn violent is 
usually context dependent, and related to the institutional structures that facilitate or prevent 
adaptation. This is a long standing matter of development though, a matter of rural change as 
commercial systems challenge and replace traditional modes of economy. Working out how this 
happens is a matter for anthropologists, geographers and other social scientists who are sensitive to 
context, field work and the small scale (Bohle 2007). But this does not provide for easy to generalize 
data of the sort that quantitative analyses by economists interested in cross national comparisons 
might consider appropriate scholarly method (Korf 2006). Neither does a focus on small scale field 
studies necessarily resolve matters; as some researchers have discovered, even small rural 
communities that might be reasonably be assumed to be largely dependent on local resources, are 
frequently more tied into the larger operation of the commercial economy than expected (Haag and 
Hajdu 2005). 
Such a review of the literature suggests the sheer complexity of matters related to resources and the 
great difficulty scholars have in formulating appropriate notions of scale in all this (O'Lear and Diehl 
2007; Dalby 2007a). How to contextualize is made especially difficult when it is clear that the global 
economy ties so many places together in commodity chains that span the globe. Fish caught in one 
ocean are landed in a port on the coast of another, frozen, shipped back across the seas to be 
processed into all manner of frozen products elsewhere. Likewise grain, and minerals and all manner 
of materials are on the move so that assumptions about local shortages and abundance are 
increasingly a matter of trade as much as they are a matter of proximate ecologies. Boycotts and 
"fair trade" certifications, policy instruments related to "blood" diamonds, and international 
campaigns on such matters as working conditions and child labour, make it clear that many 
resources that are in conflict in one way or another are in some senses unavoidably "global" (Le 
Billon 2007). 
Borders and nation states also become difficult in the matter of carbon offsets and the attempts by 
many policy makers to "sink" carbon emissions from fossil fuel use in the global "North" by using 
forestry plantations in the "South". This might fairly directly link global consumption to very local 
conflict where land uses are disrupted and traditional ways relocated to make way for the 
plantations. This pattern of resource exploitation in the peripheries of the global economy is not a 
new trend either, even if it is now justified by various "green" rationalizations (Lohmann 2006). 
Once again the causes of such violence are about the expansion of the larger global political 
economy rather than obviously indigenous causes of conflict (Roberts and Parks 2007); getting the 
geographies of this clear is important if metropolitan policies are to be considered in terms of their 
likely peripheral impact. 
Such reflections also make questions of international environmental action complicated. Nowhere 
more so than in Robyn Eckersley's (2007) ambitious attempt to extend the humanitarian intervention 
debate into matters of ecological defence and the right to intervention in the face of a major disaster 
or  the extirpation of an  important habitat  or species.  But  quite  why  the international community  
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might intervene in a case such as the threatened eradication of the great apes in Rwanda, as she 
suggests, when it failed to intervene to save thousands of Rwandans in 1994 is not so clear. But 
taking the argument seriously suggests that many of those in the "South" whose lives and in the 
case of low lying island states, even the existence of their states, is in jeopardy as a result of climate 
change caused mostly by Northern consumption, have a much better justification for intervening in 
the North to stop the profligate consumption of fossil fuels that threaten them, than those 
Northerners have for intervening in the South on whatever "environmental" grounds (Dalby 2007b). 
1.4 Anthropocene Security? 
Much of the discussion of climate change in the years since the Brundtland Commission report has 
been about mitigation or adaptation with many environmentalists reluctant to deal with the 
adaptation agenda for fear of distracting attention from the pressing needs to reduce fossil fuel 
emissions. But as numerous recent reports (UNEP 2007) that have garnered so much media 
attention of late make clear, a substantial disruption of the climate system is already underway. The 
emissions over the last few centuries and especially in the last few decades will cause ecological 
changes even if carbon fuel consumption stopped immediately (Steffen et al. 2004). The sheer scale 
of human chances to the biosphere has now made many geologists accept that we are effectively 
living in a new era called the Anthropocene. This suggests that both adaptation and mitigation are 
needed, but implementation requires an approach that combines both so that adaptation is planned 
while using technologies that mitigate emissions. The solar panel is emblematic of what is needed; 
energy with no inputs and no emissions that can run anywhere there is sunlight no matter what 
disasters and disruptions may occur elsewhere. 
Thinking about security as requiring both simultaneously is now necessary if ecology and the 
changing biosphere are the taken for granted context for research and policy formulation. The term 
Anthropocene is significant because it captures in a single evocative word the new condition of 
humanity. The Anthropocene marks the new human condition in that we are actively remaking the 
ecological context of our times. The environment is no longer out there, separate from human 
activities, but rather we are living in biosphere that we are actively remaking. This is not only a 
matter of atmospheric change, and climate modifications as a result of the emissions from 
"carboniferous capitalism" (Dalby 2002) but also in terms of land use changes which continue to 
change the vegetation and animal life of the planet dramatically, pollution and fishing in the oceans, 
the introduction of new chemicals into all parts of the biosphere and such things as the replumbing 
of most of the major rivers of the planet. Insecurity is now a matter both at the largest scale in which 
we are changing the atmosphere and probably making extreme weather events more frequent, and 
also now of the vulnerabilities manufactured by the artificial and urban landscapes we increasingly 
live within. 
All of these considerations apply in relation to disaster when preparations before, and reactions in 
the early days afterwards matter greatly to affected people. While disasters might not apparently be 
understood as being part of environmental change, and hence not appropriate matters for 
consideration in a discussion of policy and peacebuilding, the old joke about disasters simply being 
fast environmental change, and environmental change being slow disasters, suggests a direct 
relevance precisely because the vector of change is usually some form of "natural" phenomenon. 
Wars and political instabilities are also forms of disaster too, but the disruptions of the biosphere, of 
which climate change is only the most high profile, increasingly suggests that storms and 
vulnerabilities due to people living in places subject to the ravages of "natural" events, are 
increasingly a matter of artificial environments in which vulnerability due to social and political 
phenomena plays itself out. In a world of lengthy food chains and possibly more severe hurricanes 
(Shepherd and Knutson 2007), the context for change is increasingly artificial; this is the point about 
the Anthropocene as a new geological era; it might also be understood as the physical 
manifestations of globalization, a phenomenon that is about moving materials quite as much as 
moving money or changing identities (Dalby 2007c). 
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Globalization is a matter of constructing new urban spaces, ones where the majority of humanity 
now live. It is a physical process of environmental change with unavoidably challenges the 
conventional thinking about security (Brauch et al. 2008). Vulnerabilities and the possibilities of 
either cooperation or peacebuilding, or conflict and violence play out in these increasingly artificial 
landscapes. While peacebuilding and environmental matters are usually understood in terms of rural 
matters and usually among the marginal populations of the global south, the Anthropocene 
suggests that as we become an urban species the disruptions we have set in motion on the large 
scale will play out in the artificial landscapes of our "Planet of Slums" to borrow Mike Davis's (2006) 
provocative formulation. But whether these slums are portrayed as the source of threats to the 
neoliberal economic progress of the future which require security policies to contain, or are seen as 
thriving human communities whose lot in life can be aided, and for whom timely infrastructure 
provision will be needed to help them survive climate disruptions, matters greatly in terms of how 
peacebuilding might now proceed. 
1.5 Urban Vulnerabilities 
In the summer of 2005 Hurricane Katrina disrupted the infrastructure of New Orleans and drew the 
attention of the world's media to the plight of the poor struggling with, and in many cases failing to 
survive, the floodwaters. The vulnerability of those without transport, epitomized by television 
pictures of desperate survivors clinging to rooftops as the flood waters swirled around them, brought 
home to many viewers the simple fact that disasters can strike anywhere and that those without 
cars are especially vulnerable in a city without a comprehensive public transport system. 
The flooding also bluntly posed questions about sea level rise, increased intensity of hurricanes and 
the role played by climate change. So too the dredging of channels for oil tankers and pipelines, the 
reduction of wetlands around the city, and the construction of a fabricated landscape with little 
buffering capacity to absorb floods (Freudenburg, Graming, Laska, and Erikson 2007). Just as many 
Indian Ocean coastal communities had been rendered vulnerable to the tsunami's devastation at the 
end of 2004 due to the removal of coastal mangroves which traditionally act as a protection against 
waves and storm surges, the artificial landscape of Louisiana offered little protection to the residents 
of New Orleans. This was compounded by the failure of the inadequately maintained drainage 
canals and dikes that were undermined by the storm and that finally precipitated the worst flooding. 
Plans by the United States Corps of Engineers to upgrade the infrastructure had gone unfunded for 
years, despite repeated calls to shore up the dikes in a city that is slowly sinking ever further below 
sea level. 
But few commentators watching the disaster unfold in Louisiana remembered the previous month's 
massive flooding in Mumbai. The larger causes of Mumbai's disaster are in many ways similar to the 
situation of New Orleans. The tendency towards heavier rainfall through the twentieth century is 
part of the story, but so too is the increased urbanization and the spread of concrete surfaces which 
enhance runoff into drainage systems, many of which were at least partly clogged with debris and 
garbage. Wetlands, forested areas and mangroves in the area have all been substantially reduced; 
like New Orleans the natural "sponges" in the area that can absorb rainfall have been diminished. 
Mumbai however is not below sea level and the floods drained away in the following weeks. 
The political context of these victims of "unnatural hazards" however reveals a larger and important 
lesson, because it is the social and economic context of vulnerability in the aftermath of a hazard 
that determines if and how it turns into a disaster for the population. Where the poor were 
disparaged in the United States by the Bush administration and substantially blamed for their plight, 
in Mumbai the elites came to the opposite conclusion about the poor and marginal people who had 
banded together to help the flood victims there. "But what really captured the public imagination in 
the days following the floods were the selfless acts of young men conventionally seen by the middle 
classes  as loafers, threatening  the security  of  themselves and their families" (Anjaria 2006: 81). By  
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numerous acts of generosity noted by participants and the local media, their role in the city changed, 
and the politics of security were questioned: 
“Until now, researchers have only understood this mobile population for its capacity for violence, 
but what July 26 revealed was its capacity for incredible acts of generosity and selflessness. And 
uncharacteristically, the upper classes acknowledged this reality. Slum dwellers, who only days 
earlier had been declared the greatest impediment to Mumbai achieving its global dreams, were 
now declared to represent the “true spirit” of Mumbai.” (Anjaria 2006: 82) 
Where public systems collapse spontaneous actions by people in a position to help others filled the 
gap. No martial law was declared, and while chaos reigned it wasn't marked by looting, riots or the 
need for troops. 
The contrast with the media script of threatening poor people in New Orleans is noteworthy. Initial 
evacuation orders were heeded by most of the more affluent parts of the population who got into 
their cars and drove north away from the most dangerous impacts of the hurricane. But many of the 
poor stayed behind in the city. In this context: Michael Chertoff, Bush’s Secretary of Homeland 
Secretary, made a striking remark. Defending his administration’s decision to basically abandon 
those who failed to leave using their own transport to their own devices, and ignoring the fact that 
most poor residents stayed because they simply had no means to escape, Chertoff argued that “the 
critical thing was to get people out of [New Orleans] before the disaster. Some people chose not to 
obey that order. That was a mistake on their part”. 
Such rhetoric, backed by an almost complete absence of organised, public evacuation procedures, 
suggested one simple but powerful thing: if you can’t get out of the city (like rich, suburban, auto 
owners) it’s your fault. End of story. The escapees are normal, respectful, citizens. You’re not. The 
socially Darwinist, individualist and deeply anti-urban ideology that underpins so much of Bush’s 
neoconservative world-view is rarely revealed so succinctly (Graham 2006). 
Here the poor were seen as a threat, and the authors of their own misfortunes, and hence to be 
despised rather than helped, treated as a security threat to property rather than as citizens whom 
the state has an obligation to protect. 
But it is also clear that in the post 9/11 world, where neoliberalism has become one with the state in 
the American model of contracting out security functions, state functions and the traditional role of 
states in providing security and public health as well as assistance in the face of disaster, have been 
overtaken by technical practices and interventions of market and the military that are frequently 
deleterious to indigenous economies and patterns of subsistence living (Klein 2007). But adaptations 
to disaster, like the Cuban model where neighborhood planning and basic shelter provision have 
saved numerous lives (Sims and Vogelman 2002), suggest all sorts of possibilities for human 
security. But ones where survival networks and a mobilized citizenry are key, rather than the 
operation of commercial contractors and external interventions where that citizenry is seen as the 
problem to be controlled, rather than the active agents of resilient response to disaster. 
1.6 Policy and Peacebuilding 
In all the discussion of environmental security over the last few decades there is a remarkable 
absence of wars that are obviously caused by environmental factors. There is much violence and 
conflict related in numerous ways to economic and political change that has an environmental 
dimension, but in much of the scholarly literature since the Brundtland Commission report of 20 
years ago it seems to be clear that the environment is rarely a direct and immediate cause for 
violence. The fact that this is the case seems to be the key to both the literature on peace parks and 
the  broader discussions  of environmental  diplomacy  and peacemaking (Conca and Dabelko 2002).  
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Precisely because environmental matters are important to many but not a direct cause of warfare 
suggests the possibility of conflict mitigation and peacebuilding. Hence international cooperation on 
such things as peace parks act as confidence building measures and establish patterns of 
cooperation which reduce the likelihood of disputes escalating to warfare (Ali 2007). 
The neo-functionalist antecedents are a key part of the discussions of peace and regional integration 
in the international relations literature, but the point is that in many places environmental 
cooperation is a useful mode of confidence building. Shared resources usually require complicated 
arrangements to deal with locale specific issues. Peace is not imposed by fiat in these conditions, but 
worked at from the local context to larger institutions. Would that the drafters of the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, and much more specifically the Kyoto protocol, had understood that 
overarching global agreements on environmental matters are more likely to be built through a series 
of bottom up initiatives rather than an attempt to incorporate everything that is relevant into one 
formula that can be applied to the whole globe (Prins and Rayner 2007)! 
Asking the right question in the first place is key to good policy making, and assuming that the 
question is clear in advance seems to be one of the key problems with much of the scholarly and 
policy literature on environmental conflict for the last two decades. Kahl's (2006) summary of the 
environmental conflict literature struggles bravely to encapsulate the whole debate, but at the end 
the lack of a common understanding is not surprising given the multiplicity of scholarly approaches 
involved. Precisely what question is posed is of course crucial, and here, where policy agendas drive 
research, as they so frequently do, the question of who poses the question and how it fits larger 
institutional mandates cannot be avoided. Thinking through the connections in commodity chains 
and the violence that might be averted by international political strategies to manage the 
commodities is part of the puzzle (Le Billon 2007). But likewise an explicit focus on peacebuilding 
here is also relevant; not least because of the fairly robust empirical finding, especially in the 
investigations of water wars, that environmental matters frequently lead to cooperation, not least 
because of the geographical and physical attributes that make violent conflict counterproductive for 
all concerned (Giordano et.al 2005). 
Where in the larger ecological flows that are increasingly being modified and redirected by human 
activities, a particular issue lies, seems to be the key consideration for discussing security or 
peacebuilding; in the words of Wolfgang Sachs and his colleagues (2007) a "fair future" requires 
tracing these connections and simultaneously reducing over-consumption while ensuring sustainable 
commodity provision in the global economy. Hence empowering sustainable agriculture while 
reducing the disruptions by huge mining projects simultaneously tackles poverty in the case of 
agricultural development, while avoiding the potential for disruptions causing conflict over 
environmental damage and compensation. Thinking in terms of these kinds of ecological flows 
changes the context for peacebuilding by focusing not just on local institutions but on the larger 
economic and ecological connections to conflict and the possibilities of sustainable development 
directly linked to ecological considerations. 
On the largest scale this argument connects up with concerns about warfare in the Middle East and 
the case for renewable energy reducing American dependence in particular on imports of petroleum. 
The green economy argument suggests that decarbonizing the global economy has the double 
benefit of reducing the violence over resource extraction and simultaneously reducing the 
disruptions caused by greenhouse gas emissions and climate change (Paterson and Dalby). Likewise 
in the case of disruptions not being dependent on lengthy supply chains improves resilience. 
Disconnecting metropolitan reliance on essential petroleum supplies from the periphery is a 
sustainable security strategy from both ends! 
Which suggests that in one important sense peace is about building, about institutions but also 
about structures, energy consumption, and the links between rural and urban places in an 
interconnected  world  (Sachs and Santarius 2007). Peace building  is literally  about  building  things  
  Environmental Peacebuilding 
 17 
 
that are sustainable without having violent repercussions either locally or at a distance. Thinking 
about buildings, and the possibilities of structures that draw on local materials rather than distant 
concrete factories, solar energy rather than fossil fuels, and local social survival mechanisms rather 
than the instant solutions of foreign expert contractors, suggests a much more ecologically 
sustainable mode of providing security than many of the modernizing modes of development that 
are still practiced by many neo-liberal contractors and state elites. 
1.7 Conclusions 
All of which suggests the importance of an ecological interpretation of events and human 
populations, rather than a top down state centric view of things where the government runs things 
from the capital city. In James Scott's (1998) terms "seeing like a state" is in many ways still a 
problem where urban elites manipulate rural matters for their own enrichment. Ecological 
metaphors of social organization suggest that adaptability and innovation without control from 
central government may offer many possibilities. Traditional social networks and marketing 
arrangements have much to offer in a crisis. But these may be foreclosed so long as poor urban and 
rural populations are understood as a security problem that needs to be managed as either a state 
building project or as peoples in need of modernization by contemporary neo-liberalism. 
In so far as states and municipal governments provide basic infrastructure, sanitation, a public 
health system and make plans for emergency assistance where disaster strikes the human security of 
the population is enhanced (Brauch 2005). But where the poor in their slums are understood as a 
threat to a political order that emphasises international markets, and development as the promotion 
of enclaves of modernity, foreign based tourism and commodity exports, then the militarization of 
development is likely to remain a temptation for state elites. All the more so where such strategies 
can be sold abroad as a contribution to contemporary geopolitical struggles against "terrorism". For 
this reason the sooner the "war on terror" is called off the better; the militarization of many conflicts 
in the global periphery is more likely to make matters more difficult rather than facilitate 
peacebuilding. 
By now it is clear that the causes of many of the disruptions are not indigenous factors in the South, 
but rather the global economy and the strategies of the rich and powerful to sustain their current 
modes of urban consumption. We are increasingly changing those contexts and making artificial 
connections between people across the globe as we transform the biosphere (Steffen et al. 2004). 
This new recognition of the interconnectedness of our collective fates has given rise to a discussion 
of the new geological circumstances of humanity which is now living in the Anthropocene. Now we 
need to understand the global economy as a new forcing mechanism in the biosphere, not 
something separate from an external "environment". In Bruno Latour's (2007) terms we need 
earthly sciences, and a politics that explicitly has a policy for such unlikely things as the Gulf Stream, 
if the ecosystems of the planet are not to be so drastically disrupted as to make civilization as we 
know it impossible. 
Interconnections are key to all this, both between places and between humanity and the biospheric 
context that we are collectively remaking. This requires taking ecological science and the theme of 
the Anthropocene much more seriously in how we rethink security because we are literally building 
our collective future in a changing biosphere (Dalby 2007d). Our conceptual formulations of both 
environment and security thus need some updating. In light of the scientific discussions in earth 
system science it seems that while the poor in the South continue to struggle with matters of 
sustainable development, the priority for Northern consumers is now one of reversing the 
Brundtland Commission's formulation and focusing instead on the urgent need to "develop 
sustainability". 
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2 Fighting in the Desert? Conflict and Resource 
Management in East African Drylands 
Tobias Hagmann6 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Expert opinion has it that climate change is a major cause of violent conflict in the semi-arid and arid 
lowlands of sub-Saharan Africa. Prominent politicians and public intellectuals have identified climate 
change as a culprit of inter-group violence in East African drylands. Asked about the impact of land 
degradation and desertification on the Darfur conflict, Jeffrey Sachs, the director of Columbia 
University’s Earth Institute, determined that ‘but for the environmental stress; I doubt this would 
have exploded’ (Rosenthal 2007). Sachs is not the only one to point fingers to the alleged nexus 
between climate change and political upheaval. The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) chairman Rajendra K. Pachauri recently speculated that ‘climate change has 
the potential to be a problem for the maintenance of peace’ (Flynn 2008). Margaret Beckett, the 
former British Foreign Security, established that ‘a failing climate means more failed states’ (Marcus 
2006). Following the publication of major global environmental assessment reports such as the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005), the British government sponsored Stern Review (Stern 
2006) and the IPCC (Boko et al. 2007) numerous commentators have argued that climate change 
has and will fuel conflicts, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Although little validated scientific 
knowledge exists about the links between climate change and conflict (Nordås & Gleditsch 2007), 
authors have warned about the ‘double-headed problem of climate change and violent conflict’ 
(Smith & Vivekananda 2007:4), which developing countries will face in the future. 
The alarmist rhetoric about the threatening impacts of climate change as drivers of violence in 
dryland sub-Saharan Africa rejoins earlier debates about the causal links between environmental 
degradation, land use change and conflict in Africa (Suliman 1999). Initially, the discussion about 
resource-based conflicts in African lowlands was triggered by fears that increasing desertification 
and the negative impacts of global environmental change disrupt pastoral livelihoods, diminish life-
sustaining resources and thereby exacerbate violent conflicts (Baechler 1994). While individual 
studies found ample evidence for quantitative (frequency) and qualitative (dynamics) changes in 
resource related conflicts in pastoral areas, the causal links between environmental change, conflict 
and cooperation remain strongly contested (Barnett 2001, Dalby 2004, Hagmann 2005, Peluso & 
Watts 2001). Much of the environmental conflict literature - most prominently Homer-Dixon (1999) -
transpired the neo-Malthusian assumption according to which demographic growth coupled with 
environmental degradation leads to resource scarcity, which in turn fosters inter-group conflict. 
While this rather outdated neo-Malthusian notion of environmentally induced conflict has been 
severely criticized on methodological and conceptual grounds (Gleditsch & Urdal 2002), current 
debates about climate change have once again rehabilitated the idea that scarcity of renewable 
resources, namely land and water, leads to conflict. This scenario is supported by climatologists who 
predict that climate change will reduce the length of growing seasons, add pressure on water 
availability and accessibility, increase deforestation and desertification and lead to less and more 
erratic rainfall in African drylands (Boko et al. 2007). 
This paper refutes the idea that violent conflict in pastoral areas can be understood as a direct 
function of resource availability as determined by climate change. Instead of reiterating theoretical 
critiques to the environmental conflict thesis and scarcity driven explanations of violent conflict 
fostered by climate change  (Hagmann 2005), I draw attention to how pastoralists  manage conflicts 
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6   Lecturer, Department of Geography, University of Zurich. This article was prepared with the support of the Swiss National 
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and resources. While past and present debates have been obsessed with tracing the causal links 
between a given condition of the biophysical environment and violent conflict, few authors have 
taken into account conflict and resource management institutions as dependent variables that 
account for the emergence of organized violence in semi-arid lowlands. My central proposition here 
is that relations of both conflict and cooperation over natural resources must be analysed to 
understand and make a meaningful contribution to conflict transformation. This requires an 
engagement with the ecological, socio-economic and political characteristics of pastoral production 
systems as they are typically found in the East African lowlands and border regions. 
2.2 Institutions for conflict and resource management7 
Which institutions shape pastoralists’ conflict and resource management practices in the East African 
lowlands? To answer this question characteristic features of the ecological and political space in 
which transhumant livestock keeping is embedded must be recalled. It is vital to understand pastoral 
conflict and resource management strategies on the background of their wider natural and social 
context. In this respect the ‘new range ecology’ school has challenged dominant conceptions of 
rangeland management and ecology and pastoral development (Behnke 1994, Ellis & Swift 1988, 
Niamir-Fuller 1999a, Scoones 1996). New range ecology scholars have refuted historically popular 
views according to which nomadic pastoralism is economically irrational and ecologically unsound. 
By drawing attention to the non-equilibrial nature of arid and semi-arid ecosystems, they have 
argued that ecosystems regularly change from one condition to another (Niamir-Fuller 1999b). 
According to this interpretation, highly variable rainfall, vegetation and resource consumption 
patterns must be viewed not as irregularities, but as defining features of African and other drylands. 
Despite new range ecologists’ fundamental rethinking of the logic that governs human-nature 
interactions in dryland pastoralist production systems, policy-making in pastoral areas often 
continues to be informed by assumptions of herders’ economic irrationality as famously stated in 
Hardin’s (1968) ‘tragedy of the commons’ writing. 
New range ecology’s central tenets can be summarized as follows. First, extensive resource use as 
evidenced by high livestock mobility and opportunistic grazing is a rational response to the 
seasonally and spatially variable resource availability that is so characteristic of drylands (Behnke 
1994). Second, in their daily management decisions pastoralists face different types of uncertainty as 
a result of drylands’ climatic and ecological variability. Third, pastoral communities’ land tenure rules 
reflect the existence of overlapping and dynamic resource claims that do not fit static boundaries of 
clearly demarcated property rights. Fourth, property and use rights of key natural resources of the 
pastoral economy are highly socialized and are part of layered property rights regimes. Finally, 
resource ownership in pastoral production systems manifests itself in negotiated access rights 
instead of permanent property rights. These insights of the new range ecology school are of crucial 
importance when gauging the effectiveness of conflict and resource management institutions. One 
can assume that practices, patterns and policies that are in line with drylands’ non-equilibrial nature 
and their highly socialized property rights are more amenable for peaceful conflict and resource 
management than those practices, patterns and policies that contradict or disrupt them. 
Pastoralist institutions may contribute to conflict prevention and transformation for different 
reasons, but primarily because they enable cooperation and because they determine resource access. 
This point is made by Cleaver (2002:15) who argues that ’institutions of co-operation are embedded 
in everyday relations, networks of reciprocity and the negotiation of cultural norms’. An example 
illustration of this is provided by Ensminger (1990) whose ethnography of Orma herders, their 
changing property rights and incorporation into the Kenyan state, underlines how institutions enable  
 
______________________ 
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more cooperative forms of exchange. Goldschmidt’s study of tribal societies’ ‘institutions of peace’ 
highlights how pastoralists resolve inter-group competition and tension non-violently. Similarly, 
institutional rules play an important role in regulating cooperation and competition over the use of 
common-pool resources such as rangelands (Ostrom 1990). Consequently, a host of diverse and 
interacting institutions mediate relations between social actors and their natural environment as 
well as the way these actors manage natural resources (Leach et al. 1999). 
Bearing in mind these theoretical tenets, it becomes clear that conflict and resource management 
institutions have different purposes and that they are an essential part of the everyday management 
of pastoral affairs (Swift 1996). For example, conflict resolution, marriage or inheritance rules are as 
relevant for resource management as they are to govern inter-group, gender and family relations. In 
cases where violent conflict has become protracted, a reorientation of the institutional rules of 
resource use is often a precondition to allow pastoralists access to water points and rangelands 
(Lane & Moorehead 1996). Livestock keepers manage conflicts by establishing alliances, through ad 
hoc adaptations, reciprocity as well as informal sanctions or simply by avoiding disputes with 
competitors (Braukämper 2000, Niamir-Fuller 1999a). Resource management institutions are thus an 
integral part of everyday conflict prevention, management and settlement. In return, pastoralists’ 
conflict prevention, management and settlement strategies are an integral part of their everyday 
natural resource management practices. 
A persistent intellectual challenge to institutionalist interpretations of sub-Saharan politics and 
ecology is the fundamental opposition that is often drawn, both in scholarly and in folk discourse, 
between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ institutions. For example, Leach et al. (1999) distinguishes 
between ‘formal institutions’ such as statutory law, which requires exogenous enforcement, and 
‘informal institutions’ such as customary norms, which are endogenously enforced. Although many 
authors have criticized this static differentiation as unhelpful, it remains a powerful schema to 
interpret the history, rationality and functioning of institutions in developing countries. In her 
sophisticated discussion of this topic Cleaver (2001:29) warns against opposing a ‘realm of 
“traditional” informal, culturally and socially embedded institutions’ to ‘a “modern” domain of 
rationally designed committees and formal structures’. Given the adaptability of customary norms 
and practices on the one hand, and the often ‘invented’ nature of ‘traditions’ on the other hand 
(Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983), it seems more prudent to define institutions not in dichotomous terms, 
but as historically evolving norms and practices that contain multiple influences. 
This latter point is strongly made by legal pluralism scholars who emphasize the interconnectedness 
of plural social and normative orders (Merry 1992) and the necessity to consider ‘the whole 
configuration of legal plurality’ (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2003:305). While the state claims a 
monopoly of legal regulation over society, bureaucratic, customary, religious and kinship institutions 
coexist in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, offering multiple procedures and repertoires for conflict 
management. Dialectic relations exist between socially embedded rules (or what is commonly 
referred to as ‘customs’), customary norms recognized by the state and statutory law (von Benda-
Beckmann 2001). In parallel, these different legal repertoires not only contradict each other, but 
frequently constitute ‘overlapping and polycentric forms of governance’ (Meinzen-Dick & Pradhan 
2001:15) that influence conflict and resource management. The following section summarily reviews 
the contemporary dynamics of these conflict and resource management practices in greater detail 
and with reference to East African drylands. 
2.3 Transformations of the pastoral political economy 
Violence in pastoral areas must be understood on the background of the numerous long-term 
transformations that affect sub-Saharan African drylands. Herder societies and economies have been 
gradually transformed by population growth, the expansion of agro-pastoralism, the multiplication 
of water points, recurrent draughts, the institutionalization of humanitarian aid, the individualization 
of rangelands, forced and voluntary in-migration and  population movements as well as  increasingly  
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sedentarized lifestyles (Anderson & Broch-Due 1999, Fratkin & McCabe 1999, Little et al. 2001, 
Markakis 2004). Conflicts over dryland resources are embedded in evolving natural resource 
management practices and changing political frameworks that result from these transformations. 
The historical and ongoing diversification of livelihoods and political authorities in extensive 
production systems has weakened internal group cohesion and rendered collective action more 
complex. 
A common denominator of these transformations of the pastoral political economy is the 
commoditization of the biosphere as ‘new’ natural resources are drawn into regional and global 
markets. While East African livestock has been commoditized decades ago in the form of export 
goods (Samatar 1992), a wide range of renewable and non-renewable resources situated or 
produced in the lowlands are currently absorbed by local and transnational economies. In the coastal 
regions of the Horn of Africa dryland forestry, particularly acacia trees used for charcoal production 
has become an important energy source that is sold to Arab Gulf States (Lindenback 2001). 
Intensification of land use for agricultural cultivation and fodder production in increasingly 
individualized and enclosed rangelands is another indicator for commoditization. Across East Africa 
transhumance, seasonal migration and reciprocal grazing rights have been severely undermined by 
the fragmentation of rangelands and the spread of privately owned land enclosures. Similar trends 
are observable in the case of water used for irrigation, animal and human consumption, whose 
access and use often hinges on technological investments that are required for drilling wells or 
pumping water for flood irrigation. Finally, a number of lowland regions including southern Sudan 
and western and eastern Ethiopia hold significant reserves of fossil energy, which are exploited 
commercially. 
Another factor of change in East African pastoral economies is the growing involvement of 
development and humanitarian aid. Following decades of neglect, local and international 
development organizations have recognized pastoralism and drylands as areas of targeted 
intervention in Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan. As a response to the devastating droughts that hit the 
Sahel belt in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s donor sponsored relief and rehabilitation programs were 
gradually expanded to the lowlands. Particularly humanitarian aid in the form of food aid has 
become a recurrent phenomenon. In many cases food aid supplements household incomes, but it 
also raises the specter of increasing dependency on donor sponsored ‘hand-outs’ (Sandford & Habtu 
2000). In addition to routine food aid deliveries, Ethiopian pastoral communities are more and more 
benefiting from cash transfers in return for labor based public works, which are hoped to address the 
structural causes of food insecurity and chronic vulnerability. 
Initially celebrated as a policy achievement, the inclusion of pastoralism on the development agenda 
has produced paradoxical outcomes. On the one hand, pastoralism as a lifestyle and economic 
activity has gained public recognition. On the other hand, herders’ interests are represented in 
national capitals by officials and development workers who often do not originate from pastoral 
communities and/or are members of the educated urban elite (Oxby 1999). 
Recent research on pastoral conflicts in East Africa demonstrates that local institutions for conflict 
and resource management are increasingly dominated and transformed by the expanding nation-
state (Hagmann & Alemmaya 2008, Hogg 1997, Salih et al. 2001). This process is not a zero sum 
game as it reconfigures the ways in which the state and pastoral groups engage in politics while the 
historic, but not linear, process of state expansion unfolds in the Horn of Africa’s semi-arid lowlands. 
This finding is in line with Markakis’ (1994:217) earlier observation that the state represents a major 
bone of contention for conflicts in the East African lowlands ‘because it controls the production and 
distribution of material and social resources’. Most inter-personal and inter-group disputes in 
pastoralist areas, both violent and non-violent, are adjudicated by elders. Customary conflict 
resolution institutions often rely on blood compensation payments to reconcile warring groups.  
This is  the case  of  the  Afar  in Djiboutiand Ethiopia (Kassa 2001) the  Karrayu  Oromos  in Ethiopia  
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(Mulugeta 2007), the Somalis in Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya (Lewis 1999 [1961]) or the 
different tribal groups of (partly) Arab descent in Darfur (El-Battahani 2002). 
East African governments have seldom been able to secure lasting peace by recourse to legal means 
or effective policing in their lowland regions. Attempts to expand the outreach of state organs, 
particularly police, courts and jails to more remote areas, have been met with limited success. Often 
local administrations lack popular acceptance and the required resources (transport, armed forces 
etc.) to play a meaningful role as mediators and conflict managers. With the exception of urbanized 
populations, pastoralists in many instances prefer customary conflict resolution institutions over the 
formal justice system to settle disputes. The avoidance of the state’s legal system is particularly 
visible in Ethiopia’s pastoralist areas. To cite an example, Seid and Jotte (2004:12) report that out of 
a total of 215 criminal cases (homicide, attempted murder, armed robbery) observed in 2002 in the 
Korahe zone of Ethiopia’s Somali region only six were dealt with by the courts on the basis of 
statutory law. 
Various recent studies have documented the failure of Ethiopian local and regional administrations 
to provide ‘lasting solutions’ (Gedi 2005:46) to longstanding resource conflicts at communal level. In 
the case of the Boran-Degodia conflict rather than calming the situation government interventions 
‘had the effect of escalating the conflicts’ (Abdullahi 2005:15). The following paradox is thus 
observed; although the state perceives outbreaks of physical violence in its pastoral lowlands - most 
notably cattle raids and associated violence - as a challenge to its sovereignty and monopoly of 
violence, it does not have the appropriate means to resolve these conflicts durably (Mulugeta & 
Hagmann 2008). Furthermore, in their attempts to contain and resolve resource-based and other 
inter-group conflicts, Ethiopian state interventions are spatially limited, inclined towards coercion 
and rarely long-term oriented (Hagmann & Mulugeta 2008). While herders’ customary conflict 
management institutions have been eroded by the transformation of the pastoral economy and 
increasing state incorporation, government sponsored conflict resolution often is not very effective. 
The result is a ‘crisis of reconciliation’ (Abbink 2000) as pastoral communities can rely neither on 
state nor on customary institutions to resolve conflict. 
2.4 Conclusions 
Despite its intuitive logic, the assertion that climate change fosters resource scarcity driven conflicts 
in sub-Saharan African drylands is over simplified. While changing qualitative and quantitative 
parameters of local resource pools certainly have an impact on human behavior, a linear causality 
between the two does not exist. Rather human agency, or what is commonly refereed to as 
‘adaptation’ in the human ecology literature, represents the intervening variable between 
environmental change and inter-group relations. As this paper has demonstrated both theoretically 
and empirically, conflict and resource management institutions and practices determine whether and 
how conflicts (de-)escalate. Although conventional wisdom associates resource scarcity with 
violence in East African lowlands, local practices of resource sharing arrangements often ensure 
peaceful coexistence (Bogale & Korf 2007, Eaton 2008). Changing conflict dynamics in East African 
lowlands are primarily the result of the concomitant break-down of customary institutions and the 
inability of central and local governments to enforce communal property rights. The result are de 
facto open-access tenure regimes that benefit groups with higher bargaining power as they are 
better placed to capture strategic resources of the pastoral economy. 
The analysis of the institutional, social and ecological intricacies of violent conflict in African 
drylands reveals the continuous importance of politics as the main explicative variable for inter-
group tension. Violence among pastoral and agro-pastoral groups must not only be seen in the 
context of changing local institutions and political economy, but is fundamentally political and is 
closely associated with everyday experiences of marginalization, exclusion and oppression. Whilst 
the environmental conflict and climate change conflict hypotheses impute causal power to 
environmental change, political dynamics are as important. Relations  between the state and  pasto- 
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ralists, between herders and farmers, and between competing resource users are conditioned by 
political circumstances that define who is entitled to material opportunities, decision-making and 
representation. Contemporary conflicts in East African lowlands are the product of competition over 
urban real estate, multi-party elections and state budgets as much as struggles over rangelands and 
water wells (Hagmann & Mulugeta 2008). Strategies that aim at conflict transformation must 
consider the variegated nature and modernity of contemporary violence in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Herders do not simply fight over the desert because they are animated by subsistence need, but 
because they pursue politically, culturally and economically rational agendas. 
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3 It’s about More Water. Natural Resource Conflicts 
in Central Asia 
Christine Bichsel8 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A body of academic and policy-oriented literature began to focus on the danger of conflict in Central 
Asia as of the late 1990s. While differing in details, the authors concurred that the Ferghana Valley 
has a high potential for violent conflict. They base this potential on evidence of past violent episodes 
and/or present tensions that may yield in violence. In other words, these writings depict the 
Ferghana Valley as a ‘host of crises’ (Slim 2002) or a ‘flashpoint of conflict’ (Tabyshalieva 1999:vii). 
The literature argues in general lines that the potential for conflict is constituted by a broad array of 
interlinked conflictive factors, including social, political, economic, religious, demographic, military, 
and criminal ones. A core concern of this literature is inter-ethnic conflict over natural resources, 
aptly summarised by Slim (2002:511): ‘In the short term, they [aid agencies] must focus on the 
localities where water-based conflicts have taken on an ethnic character and which, if not 
addressed, might provide the spark for region-wide interethnic violence’. This literature on conflict in 
the Ferghana Valley stressed the need for interventions by international aid to avert widespread 
violence resulting form this potential. 
This concern was taken up by several donor organisations in early 2000, including the three aid 
agencies on which this article focuses. First, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
(SDC) is a governmental donor organisation which coordinates international development activities 
of Switzerland as a part of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Second, Mercy Corps International 
(Mercy Corps) is an international NGO which acts in this case as an implementing agency for the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Third, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) is a multilateral aid agency and represents the UN’s global development 
network in Central Asia. While these three agencies have implemented a multitude of projects in 
Central Asia, for this article I base my insights on three only. With regard to SDC, this is the 
‘Regional Dialogue and Development’ (RDD) project active over the period 2002-2005 in Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In the case of Mercy Corps, I look into the ‘Peaceful Communities 
Initiative’ (PCI) implemented in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and later also Tajikistan during 2001–
2006. For UNDP, I focus on the ‘Preventive Development Component’ (PDC) and later ‘Preventive 
Development Programme’ (PDP) conducted over the period 2000-2005 mainly in southern 
Kyrgyzstan, but at a later stage also in northern Tajikistan. My main argument is that the three 
projects rest on a misconceived interpretation of the conflicts upon which they were devised to act. 
Because they see conflict as an endemic element in village life and because their perspective is 
strongly influenced by a functional interpretation of the issue of scarcity, aid agencies in this context 
fail to take into account the political dimension of social change, and do not pay enough attention to 
the issue of power in natural resource conflict management. 
3.2 Engaging with conflict at the village level 
With these three projects, SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps aimed to mitigate conflicts over water and 
land between rural communities differing in ethnic affiliation. The three aid agencies largely 
subscribed to a similar approach, although it varied in detail, implementation, and the weight  given  
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to singular components. It centred on the combination of the following three components: (1) 
building or rehabilitating infrastructure; (2) establishing and training community-based organisations 
(CBOs); (3) fostering joint social activities between the adversarial groups. The first component 
entails the building and rehabilitation of drinking water and irrigation infrastructure, but also 
healthcare, educational and recreational facilities. It should help communities at loggerheads to 
resolve the structural causes of conflict, related to the scarcity of natural resources and to the 
dysfunctional state of infrastructure. The second component consists in establishing and training 
CBOs for each conflict party. By means of CBOs, communities should be enabled to mobilise and 
constructively address the conflict at stake, turning it into a more peaceful relationship. The third 
component involves fostering joint social activities between the adversarial groups. It entails the 
creation of social spaces for conflict parties or parts of them to interact, such as youth clubs, sports 
competition or festivals. Cultivating communication, trust and personal friendship is expected to 
improve inter-group relations. 
SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps implemented this approach numerous times in the Ferghana Valley. In 
most cases, the social unit for implementation included two or several village sharing an irrigation 
system, within which conflictive claims over water and land had arisen. The three aid agencies thus 
conceptualised conflict as existing in a limited spatial extension expressed by the villages and their 
adjacent land, as well as in a confined scalar dimension in that its roots were seen as residing only in 
the relationships between the conflict parties. In my exploration, I follow this particular perspective 
adopted by the aid agencies and explore their approach based on three such cases in the Ferghana 
Valley. The first case focuses on the three villages of Pülgön, Khalmion and Alga in Kyrgyzstan. The 
three villages share a large irrigation system on the border of Uzbekistan. While in particular 
Khalmion is likely to have a very long history of irrigated agriculture, the main canal infrastructure 
now in place was built during the 1970s. With independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the 
overall share of water available for the irrigation system became dependent on inter-governmental 
agreements between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Disputes over irrigation water are a frequent 
occurrence in this irrigation system. They have occurred and do occur between upstream and 
downstream users, and also between Kyrgyz and Uzbek populations in this area. Yet, so far, 
governmental agencies as well as water users have managed to successfully resolve these disputes. 
The second case centres on the three villages of Khush'iar in Uzbekistan, and Sogment and Charbak 
in Kyrgyzstan. They came into public attention with a violent escalation of the conflict in spring 
2005. The three villages share a complicated cross-border irrigation system whose main canal dates 
back to the period of the Second World War. The system was enlarged with additional pumps and 
canals during the 1970s in order to satisfy the growing need for water. Rather than for the 
considerable amounts of water transported by the main canal, disputes occur over water distribution 
from a small spring. These disputes have been framed by analyses in terms of animosities between 
Kyrgyz and Tajiks which inhabit the three villages. Mercy Corps has addressed these disputes during 
2002-2003. The third case entails the two villages of Aksai in Kyrgyzstan and Tojikon in Tajikistan. It 
is, compared with the two cases described above, the most long-standing dispute over water and 
land. At the same time, the conflict resulted in the largest number of casualties over time. The 
infrastructure of the irrigation system in place was built between the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
However, disputes between Aksai and Tojikon date further back into the Soviet period and can be 
traced to the 1930s. The conflict is often explained in terms of long-standing inter-ethnic animosities 
between Kyrgyz and Tajiks. The dispute between Aksai and Tojikon has been addressed by two aid 
agencies in the focus of my research (see Bichsel 2009). In 2003-2004, SDC and UNDP attempted to 
resolve the conflict over irrigation water. 
A conceptual analysis of the aid agencies’ approach to conflicts over land and water shows that they 
are guided by three basic assumptions. First, SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps assume that competition 
over limited water and land may divide communities along ethnic lines. They expect that economic 
deprivation and unsatisfied human needs lead people to resort to violence. The causal link between 
increasing  resource  scarcity  and  the  occurrence  of  inter-group  violence  follows  a  hypothesis in 
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environmental conflict or environmental security research on mainly intrastate conflict. During the 
1990s, several research projects established a causal relationship between the environment, scarcity 
and violence, however mediated by context factors (see for example Baechler 1998; Homer-Dixon 
1996, 1999). Thus, in the aid agencies’ approach, water and land scarcity becomes the explanatory 
factor linking irrigation and inter-group violence, resulting from mismanagement, socio-economic 
deterioration and demographic pressure. They attempted to remedy scarcity by means of improved 
infrastructure which should supply additional water. 
Second, SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps state that violent conflict is a dysfunctional social condition 
and should be transformed into a peaceful state by non-violent means. For this, they subscribe to the 
concept of conflict transformation (Lederach 1995; Miall 2004; Mitchell 2002). Within this concept, 
they suggest that behavioural, relational and structural changes should bring about peace. In terms 
of behavioural changes, the aid agencies expect that the conflict parties need to adopt moderation, 
tolerance and affect control. Relational changes should be achieved through increased contact 
between the groups at loggerheads, therefore reducing prejudices and improving social relations 
between them. The three aid agencies foresee that joint social activities should bring about such 
change. Structural change, finally, should alter the very constitution of society which gives rise to or 
supports the continuation of conflict (Miall 2004:70).This faulty constitution is located in the socio-
political construction of the state. Civil society should therefore foster more democratic and peaceful 
governance. However, the aid agencies also attempt to tap on the local potential for peace in the 
form of traditional institutions (Lederach 1995). 
Third, the three aid agencies expect social change to happen with the emergence of specific forms of 
power. This idea is expressed most distinctly when they speak of the need for empowerment that, in 
their view, bears the potential for change. Such power should result from specific forms of social 
interaction which brings to life associational power. Through participatory procedures, the conflict 
parties should be empowered to exert collective action for the public good. The aid agencies locate 
such power to a high degree in individual members of a community. They expect power to increase 
with the successful pursuit of individual and collective goals, not conditional upon prior changes in 
structures and systems (Mohan and Stokke 2000:249). At the same time they expect that with the 
emergence of ‘civil society’, this power may exert pressure on autocratic and unresponsive states 
and thereby support the desired change towards a more democratic governance which should 
foreclose violence. The establishment of CBOs is central for such change. 
3.3 Scarcity as a social and political issue 
My empirical data, stemming from the three cases presented, provides insights for a critical 
discussion of the there basic assumptions outlined above. I have outlined the conceptualisation of 
the link between population growth, the environment and conflict that the aid agencies bring 
forward. They posited, as it has been suggested, that ‘grievances’ arising from ‘scarcity’ divide 
groups along ethnic lines and drive them to adopt violence. The empirical analysis showed that there 
were moments in all three cases when people apprehend water as scarce. Yet, as the detailed 
explorations of social relations within irrigation systems show, at closer sight the phenomenon 
defies easy definition and generalisation. First, the experience of ‘scarcity’ is not simply an overall 
characteristics of an irrigation system, but appears in temporally and spatially discrete instances. 
Second, ‘scarcity’ is far from being a merely natural condition. It results from local institutional 
contexts but is equally embedded in shifts of larger political and socio-economic networks over time. 
Third, the experience of ‘scarcity’ is not an objective dimension. The meaning that people attribute 
to it cannot be understood outside specific economic, political and cultural contexts. ‘Scarcity’ is thus 
socially as well as naturally constituted, and a result of complex human interaction (see also Barnett 
2000; Hartmann 2001; Timura 2001). 
For irrigation systems, socially constituted water scarcity is often attributed to human needs or 
greed.  In  this  view,  human  greed  leads to depriving  others of  their water, while through human 
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needs the phenomenon ‘scarcity’ comes into view. My research has shown that human agency in 
relation to water and meanings attributed to it are complex, and the practice of upgrading one’s 
water supply at the expense of others is not easily understood as greed that results in needs. On the 
one hand, such a practice may characterise human voraciousness, instructively pointed out by the 
following Kyrgyz saying, which states that ‘Even if one’s stomach is full, one’s eyes are still hungry’. 
On the other hand, the same practice may have its motivation in human foresight and precaution, 
when water is hoarded to provide for the ‘black day’, which is characterised by the inherent 
uncertainty about water provision in the system. The proximity of the two possible explanations - 
that may furthermore not be mutually exclusive - blurs the boundaries between needs and greed, 
and show furthermore the relativity of the two concepts. 
Moreover, it is important to ask to whom ‘needs’ and ‘greed’ is attributed. My research has shown 
that water distribution does not necessarily constitute or divide groups along ethnic or kinship lines, 
but is often rather based on residential or territorial collectivities. Yet, this distinction is at times 
obscured by the fact that residential and ethnic groups coincide. Furthermore, in the case of water, 
solidarity is contextual and temporal, and may not automatically arise as often presumed. In relation 
to this, it is important to note that dimensions of irrigation systems often include formal, ideological 
discourses of how it should work, descriptive accounts of how it actually works, and, again 
differently, the actual social practices that take place (see also Hunt and Hunt 1976:392). Therefore, 
monolithic representations of groups should not be taken for granted, neither in relation to water 
nor with regard to the very nature of kinship and ethnicity. The diffuse nature of ‘scarcity’ also 
questions universal forms of causalities proposed to arise from them. Experiences of ‘scarcity’ lead to 
numerous social responses that do not imply violence (Barnett 2000:283). At the same time, 
competition for water is a distinct reality during the irrigation season. Yet again, daily skirmishes 
and fights that arise from such competition should not be mistaken for inter-group violence, since 
the latter follows a different logic. The complexities of the conflict escalation show that such 
processes are essentially cultural and political work and entail much more than just a response to a 
state of a natural resource (Schröder and Schmidt 2001). Furthermore, the close scrutiny of 
interpretational and representational politics in the course of escalations forms renders the very idea 
of linear, unidirectional causality chains problematic. 
Yet causality should not easily be disbanded, as violence is often discussed as a symptom to find 
causes and cures (Feldman 1995:226). Explanations of violent events may not unearth actual 
causalities, but provide crucial insights into how people assert situations and how they attribute 
meanings to what happens. Moreover, they may express deeply held values at the core of the 
dispute. To illustrate this, I turn to the violent escalation that took place between Aksai and Tojikon 
in 1975. In an interview, an elder from Aksai remembered how residents of Tojikon began to extend 
the cultivation of land towards Aksai. As a consequence, a group of elders had repeatedly appealed 
to the authorities of the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and equally to their Tajik neighbours 
to stop these activities. Yet, as my interlocutor suspected and other persons alleged, authorities of 
the Kyrgyz SSR had tacitly agreed to concede the respective piece of land with leaders from the Tajik 
SSR, and concluded a secret deal. Suspecting betrayal by their own authorities, as the elder 
explained, this was the moment when ‘the Kyrgyz became very angry and prepared for war’, 
perceived to be the only way to solve the problem by taking things into their own hands. Thus in this 
instance, it may not so much be the mere restriction of freedom and civil rights which gives rise to 
violence, but also the ultimate feeling of not being recognised and abandoned by the state. 
This observation touches upon the norms and values that construe the concept of conflict 
transformation. This prescriptive approach is underpinned by a number of normative choices. While 
it defines the dysfunctionality of a social condition, it equally projects a remedied situation through 
social change. Dysfunctionality is identified by SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps mainly in forms of 
individual attitudes, inter-group relationships and faulty institutions. In view of this, the aid agencies 
promote societal and political change, defined in categories such as ‘modern’, ‘traditional’, ‘civil’, 
‘participatory’  and  ‘democratic’.  My research  shows  that these categories are neither obvious nor 
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uncontested. Not only do they refer to vague, reified and idealised constructions, but the concept of 
conflict transformation is defined teleologically by reference to the supposed state of those who 
promote it. Thus, I argue that the frame of reference for the promoted social change becomes the 
supposed state of the societies that the donors are embedded in. Such an idea is explicitly expressed 
by Senghaas (2004) who suggests that ‘the West’, having undergone modernisation, can provide 
solution to those who are still in the process of it. Empirically, it also becomes manifest in the 
example of the CBOs whose social imaginary appears to pursue an idealised version of Western 
political organisation - not to be taken for an actual social practice. In this sense, conflict 
transformation entails a distinct ethnocentric bias. Such a bias becomes all the more problematic 
when coupled with ideas about moral progress towards a more peaceful, more civil and more 
harmonious society which underlie the aid agencies’ approach and on which I will elaborate later. 
In addition, the concept of conflict transformation also entails distinctly evolutionary narratives of 
how societies are expected to develop. Again, this is most clearly expressed by Senghaas (2004), 
who suggests that there is a road to modernity. CBOs stand in this sense for a future model, while 
past ones such as the elders merely serve instrumental or process-oriented purposes. The validity of 
this evolutionary idea has been contested by two insights. First, the inquiry into institutional 
histories of customary institutions in Central Asian societies discloses multiple ‘modernities’ and 
multiple ‘traditions’ that result from several layers of pre-Tsarist and Tsarist social engineering as 
well as Soviet modernisation schemes. Second, it demonstrates that institutions do not simply 
progressively evolve on a presumably pre-defined road to the future. Rather, they are consciously 
altered in their normative repertoire, their scope of validity and their social significance, at times 
appropriated by the state. Benda-Beckmann et al. (2003:297) note for traditionalism that, ‘It usually 
results from present- and future-oriented strategies for (re)asserting collective identities and for 
dealing with competing political and economic claims’. ‘Re-traditionalising’, as it is being done by 
Central Asian states to create a national ideology, or ‘modernising’ institutions, as the aid agencies 
attempt with the substantive societal change through CBOs, are thus quintessentially political 
projects. 
The promotion of civil society in the form of CBOs by the aid agencies entails a distinct vision of how 
the state and the individual should engage with each other. The model of the ‘active citizen’ which 
underlies CBOs, I suggest, is to confront the presumably determined subjects of formerly state 
socialist regimes with new forms of agency, making reference to a ‘valorized “Western” Self’ 
(Junghans 2001, p. 383) that is understood as self-authoring. The state, on the other hand, appears 
usually ‘out there’, and is thus referred to as being outside and ‘above’ local communities. This is 
exemplified by Lederach’s (1997) idealised representation of the state’s constitution, hierarchically 
structured. My empirical findings, however, strongly contests such a view. They show not only that 
the diffuse yet omnipresent nature of the state cannot be relegated to a level or a centre, but they 
similarly demonstrate that the contestation of what a state should be and how it should function 
takes place precisely at the level of the community. Equally, the boundary between those who 
personify the state and those who do not, appears blurred and cannot sharply be distinguished as 
suggested by SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps. 
These reflections lead to the issue of power. I have suggested that the aid agencies intended to 
evoke a form of ‘power to’ in the form of associational power. At the same time, the aid agencies 
and their projects themselves constitute a form of power that they exert. The analysis of the CBOs 
established by the aid agencies has shown, not surprisingly, that local societal arrangements and 
power relations (e.g., gender relationships) inscribe themselves into the organisation. In this sense, 
existing social relationships are not left ‘at the boundary’ of the new space that CBOs create, but 
continue to exert influence on how such organisations constitute themselves. Yet, the aid agencies 
also create new forms of power relations with CBOs. They shape specific public spaces where 
elections are held and decisions are supposed to be made. Such spaces may provide a forum for 
some, while excluding others. Furthermore, they give importance to particular types of knowledge 
and  expertise  held  by  segments of society. Finally, they shape specific forms of ‘subjectivities’ that 
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they construe for the inclusion into CBOs such as the elderly, the women and ethnic groups. In this 
sense, to some extent CBOs do rewrite the subjectivities of those who participate in the exercise of 
popular agency. 
SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps locate power to a high degree in human agency. Such agency is 
expected to develop without prior changes in structures and systems, even notwithstanding the 
stark forms of control and by no means conducive conditions. In this view, power thus resides with 
individual members of a community, and can increase with specific forms of sociability and the 
successful pursuit of individual and collective goals. Through this conceptualisation, responsibility for 
non-violent behaviour and relationships is being conceptually relegated to the conflict parties. 
Moreover, within the civilising and modernising ideas that underlie the approach, failure of the 
conflict parties to foreclose further violence is accordingly relegated to lacking moral progress 
towards peace. At least theoretically, such evaluation perpetuates the need for ‘engaging those who 
are not as yet fully committed to peaceful change’ (Mercy Corps 2003:17) into further peace-
building, along the lines of Ferguson’s (1990) influential statement of international aid as an ‘anti-
politics machine’ which grinds on in a self-perpetuating manner. 
However, it would be much too simple to conceive of the aid agencies’ approach as the only nexus 
of power and knowledge that shapes the context. I have suggested (Bichsel 2009) that both the aid 
agencies and Central Asian states rewrite subjectivities of ‘beneficiaries’ and ‘citizens’ through 
projects of modernisation and re-traditionalisation. Furthermore, establishing knowledge about a 
conflict is a field of contestation for which the aid agencies may provide a site for expression; 
however, the processes that shape this contestation are far beyond the reach of the latter. In this 
sense, rather than constituting a regime of domination, I suggest that SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps 
provide new space for political action and competition. The types of authority that become manifest 
in such competition and the forms of power that they constitute themselves from is often beyond the 
‘local’. Accordingly, enabling or constraining conditions and relations that crucially shape the room 
for manoeuvre for CBOs are not located in their constituencies. This observation questions the 
territorially defined and ‘locally’ understood nature of CBOs, and may also suggest that the idea of 
‘community’ upon which aid agencies base their approach is of an essentialist and romanticised 
nature (see Delanty 2003). Finally, these reflections also question the idea of peace as a potential to 
be tapped locally, as the attempt of tapping ‘positive local traditions and customs’ (Mercy Corps 
2003:19) suggests. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Harmony, the ultimate goal of SDC, UNDP and Mercy Corps, surfaces in many forms. It appears in 
the continuation of a ‘success story’ that describes ‘[…] the sincere well-wishes and goodwill that 
residents of Ravot brought to the opening [of the new drinking water system] to offer to their 
neighbors in Vorukh’ (USAID 2003, no pagination). In this quotation, harmony is presumed in the 
absence of violence and the presence of friendly behaviour shown by the groups. This quotation 
locates harmony mainly in the behavioural realm and does not foreclose unequal relationships and a 
perception of an imposed compromise. Furthermore, a particular form of harmony also appeared in 
Khush’iar, when the Uzbekistani government violently quelled any form of possible unrest related to 
the conflict escalation by control and arms. The superimposed normalcy established resurfaces then 
as a representational fiction of harmony in the Kyrgyzstani and internationally oriented press which 
presented the conflict as resolved. Finally, harmony appears in the speech of the CBO representative 
that I met in the course of the escalation and who argued for moderation and tolerance after the 
outbreak of violence. In the face of other social forces and increased militarisation of the context, his 
elaborations on harmony appear not only forlorn, but become a source of suspicion. I thus conclude 
that the very idea of harmony does not embody the abstract ‘good’, but is itself intertwined with 
forms of power. 
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I suggest that SDC, Mercy Corps and UNDP failed to provide a solution to the conflicts at stake in 
the Ferghana Valley. In my view, this is a consequence of the three aid agencies’ conceptualisation 
of these conflicts as emerging from adversarial relationships over scarce resources between ethnic 
communities and thus resolvable in the very same context. I propose four major points of critique to 
such an approach. 
1. The perspective that conflict is endemic to the local context. 
The first point of critique concerns the perspective that the sources of conflicts addressed are lodged 
in the relationship between communities differing in ethnic affiliation. The approach apprehends 
irrigation conflict as disrupted relations between two or several communities, and thus solvable in 
the very same context. My research demonstrates that such conflicts are not ‘local’ but embedded in 
wider political interests and power constellations. Issues at stake are thus often impervious to a 
‘local’ solution. 
2. The functional understanding of conflict. 
The second point of critique addresses the functional understanding of conflict sources and parties 
that the approach exposes. Conflict is seen to emerge from ‘grievances’ over scarce resources. Such 
‘grievances’ are expected to lead to violent conflict. Moreover, conflict parties are conceptualised as 
homogenous and uniform, shaped by essentialist solidarity that accounts for collective goals in a 
conflict. This research has pointed out the relativity of scarcity, has questioned that primarily 
unsatisfied needs lead to the adoption of violence and has finally deconstructed the monolithic 
representations of ethnic groups. 
3. The assumption of homology between the conflict parties. 
The third point of critique concerns the assumption of homology between conflict parties. The 
donors presume such homology not only between the conflict parties, but also between the CBOs 
and, more abstractly, for the enabling and constraining conditions which conflict mitigation meets in 
the respective countries. My work has pointed out that upstream-downstream configurations in 
irrigation systems are power relations. Furthermore, it has shown that conflict and its mitigation do 
not take place outside power constellations. 
4. The normative nature of proposed social change. 
The fourth point of critique addresses the normative nature of the social change brought forward by 
donors. It maintains that both by portraying irrigation conflicts and by proposing their 
‘transformation’, the approach studied exposes normative accounts of evolution and moral progress. 
The study has brought to light some of these assumptions and suggests that apart from their 
ethnocentric bias, such prescriptions also lead to forms of depoliticisation and disempowerment. 
Expressed in admittedly simplified terms, more water does not equal ‘better’ people, as is presumed. 
Promotion of the aid agencies’ approach is based on the assumption that conditions of equal power 
exist between the two parties. It further assumes that negotiation and mediation take place in a 
vacuum, thus isolated from the local political and economic context, let alone the wider political 
contingencies, power constellations, and elite interests. This may be a consequence of underlying 
assumptions that causes of conflict are to be found in the relationship between communities, and 
that negotiation and mediation take place between equal partners and outside power relations. 
Nader notes that ‘the rhetoric of harmony law models is attractive. But the idea that in a conciliatory 
model people do not fight but rather harmoniously agree about a common solution is fiction. So also 
is the belief that such a harmony model exists in “primitive” and “idyllic” societies. Once again we 
need to understand the real dynamic of power that is at play’. (Nader 2001: 25). 
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4 Risks and Conflict Management Options of Water 
Property Rights Reforms. Empirical Evidences from 
Shared Systems for Irrigation Water in Ethiopia 
Moges Shiferaw9 
4.1 Introduction 
There are two approaches on how governments can influence property rights over common goods: 
the new institutional economic approach and the political science approach. The political science 
approach to a reform is a widely implemented reform approach in developing countries, although it 
has been criticized for ignoring the conflict dimension of a reform as well as for its rigidity (see for 
example Moorehead 1994; Scoones 1994a). On the contrary, the new institutional economic 
approach is conflict inclusive and flexible, but was less practice-oriented until recently (Platteau, 
1995). After years of overlooking the property rights centered reform approach in managing 
common problems, countries are starting to realize that property is a central element of economic 
development and social prosperity. In the course of the last decade developing countries have tried 
to implement policies and legislations that recognize the importance of common property systems 
for the management of local common goods such as forests, pastures and irrigation systems. The 
growing scarcity of water resources and increasing competitions among users have also pressured 
governments to develop a less politically sensitive property rights system to water management. 
Despite the efforts at local level, institutional shortcomings are still highly pronounced. 
However, the potential risks of a property reform, technical difficulties and the inability to establish a 
uniform system for all types of common goods, as well as unintended or ineffective reform outcomes 
have remained major obstacles for initiating substantial property rights reform programs. More 
importantly, the lack of a flexible framework that can be used to effectively explain most of the 
property rights arrangements found in the real world and the magnitude of the reforms required to 
respond to changes in various factors have led to wrong policy choices and excessive or insufficient 
interventions. This adds a new dimension to the task of promoting a property rights reform, i.e. the 
identification of risk-free and workable policy prescriptions for a property rights reform. This paper 
focuses on the search for such alternative policy prescriptions and frameworks used to explain real-
life property rights. The framework is also used to evaluate the efficiency of shared irrigation systems 
in Ethiopia. 
We argue that the missing link in current reform programs in the field of water property rights is the 
use of policy prescriptions that are not suitable to the current reality. The current policy prescriptions 
for water rights reforms that focus on “getting the collective incentives rights” are less desirable for 
a society’s common resources, at least in the context of a developing economy where water is 
considered both an economic and a social resource. Although “getting the collective incentive right” 
policy prescriptions make a user society responsible and the work of its institutions and 
organizations make significant contributions in water economies, the prescriptions overlook the 
human dependency on water and the dynamic nature of water scarcity as well as the conflicts that it 
generates. A policy prescription that focuses on “Getting the property relations right” seems to be 
more responsive to the pressing needs for water rights reforms. It also helps to delineate the areas 
of government interventions, which is one of the major challenges in the current reform approach. 
The basic hypothesis of the above policy prescription is that if we manage to get the relationship 
among water sharing parties right, nearly all the problems will be resolved by the parties exercising 
those rights. The role of the government should therefore be limited to getting the initial relations 
correct and balanced. 
 
______________________ 
9   Research for this article was conducted with the support of the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research North-
South (NCCR N-S). 
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The next section offers an overview of alternative policy prescriptions for a property rights reform. It 
presents the importance of the approach of bundles of property rights, and subsequently describes 
general principles related to a socially optimal property rights system. A framework used to measure 
the efficiency of a property rights system is also presented. In the second section, we present the 
data used to analyze the social optimality of property rights in shared irrigation systems in Ethiopia. 
In section three, we present the outcomes of the analysis and its policy implications. 
4.2 Social Property Rights Reform Framework 
In a social property rights system approach resources are conceptualized in terms of bundles of 
rights over valuable attributes of a resource. In literature, equating a resource with bundles of rights 
is well documented (for example Brazel 1982, 1997; Eggertssonn 1990; Ellickson 1993). What a 
society shares is not a resources per se but bundles of rights. Thus, in the context of socially shared 
water resources, the concern is the social distribution of bundles of rights. This social structure of 
rights determines a society’s behavior, action and responses to any water related issue. A social 
property rights reform is therefore the appropriation of all essential bundles of rights to a society’s 
water use. For this to happen, a prior determination of essential bundles of rights that need to be 
allocated, as well as a decision about who should own particular property rights, an 
institutionalization and an initial allocation of rights are important. This conceptual framework of 
equating a resource with bundles of rights leads to two major shifts in thinking: a shift from a 
“resource first”- approach to a user-society perspective; and a shift from an objective indicator to a 
structural perspective. The latter implies that a society’s structure of property over resources is the 
main factor explaining performance variabilities across societies and time. Therefore, scarcity - and 
who suffers from it - is ultimately a socially defined structure of rights and entailments rather than a 
scarcity of a resource as a physical entity. It is the structure of a society’s rights that determines the 
society’s response to any situation, such as conflict. 
Let’s imagine a society with n members that share a clearly demarcated and well defined geographic 
territory containing a water system (e.g. a basin, a watershed, or an irrigation system) which has a 
potential to generate X units of water flow per second. The territory defines the boundary of the 
society’s property in order to make decisions about water issues. Given the physical boundaries of a 
resource, there are two important questions that one should ask in order to understand the structure 
of shared property rights in a society. The first deals with the existing property rights regarding the 
use of the resource. Below we have for instance identified seven essential bundles of property rights 
relating to the use and management of common resources. Schlager and Ostrom (1992) identified 
five bundles of rights relevant for the use of common resources. Assuming that rights are 
exogenously provided by the government, a community of resource users may be given one or all 
bundles of rights. A particular bundle of rights in the community may not exist in another community 
of resource users. The difference in the number of the total bundles of rights explains the quantity of 
property rights of the community as a whole. 
The second question relates to the fact that concentration and de-concentration of bundles of rights 
may vary. The most important distinction can perhaps be made between private property, where all 
bundles are concentrated in the hands of a single member of the society and collective property, 
where all bundles of rights are jointly held by all members. It is needless to say that a classification 
of social systems relating to resources and based on the degree of centralization of the control is 
closely related to the degree of concentration of bundles of rights in the hands of a single individual. 
A property is said to be freely accessible if all bundles of rights are freely exercised by all members of 
the society - i.e. if there are no internal exclusion rights. A property right is said to be communal if all 
bundles of rights are exercised jointly by all members of the society and competitions about 
exercising shared rights are resolved through majority voting. Finally, a property right is said to be 
social if all bundles of rights are exercised collectively in the form of public choice. In this case 
individuals not only have the right to vote, but the majority has the obligation to respect individual 
preferences or choices in the collective decision-making. 
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4.2.1. Measuring the Social Optimality of a Property Rights System: 
Theoretical Framework 
The social optimality of a property rights system can be measured in terms of numbers of bundles of 
rights and associated quality parameters. Unlike the two conventional frameworks of a property 
rights system (all bundles of rights held by a private individual or all bundles of rights held by the 
community as a whole), which tend to focus on one side of the problem of rights inefficiency, we 
have a feeling that the best way of measuring the efficiency of a property rights system in our 
framework can be achieved by combining the two components of common-pool resources (CPRs): 
property rights to a resource system and property rights to a resource flow. The central idea is that 
the two components of CPRs are interrelated and hence that the property rights systems are 
complementary and must be considered in an integrated manner if the objective is to establish and 
maintain an efficient property rights system that leads to a Pareto efficiency outcome through 
voluntary bargaining at different levels. We are optimistic that it is possible to solve both 
components of the problem by establishing and maintaining an efficient property rights system for 
CPRs that comprises both (appropriately aggregated) private resource flow rights and communal 
resource system rights. In order to create a more systematic framework for socially optimal property 
rights, it will be useful to conceptualize the total CPR’s rights system in terms of two sub-systems: a 
resource system and a system for resource flow rights. 
Systems for Resource Flow Use Rights 
Recognizing the shared nature of property rights, Alchian (1965); Demsetz and Alchian (1972) and 
Eggertsson (1990) identified the three bundles of property rights that are most relevant for shared 
asset ownership: the right to consume, the right to obtain income from the resource, and the right to 
alienate (sell) either of the other use rights. This classification dates back to Roman law (Meinzen-
Dick, 2000). According to Meinzen-Dick Roman law distinguished between four bundles of rights in 
a property rights system: the right to use the resource (usus right); the right to derive income from 
the resource (usufructus right); the right to change the resource (abusus right); and right to transfer 
the resource to others (alienation right). 
In order to build our framework, we will use these four bundles of property rights as essential 
elements of resource flow rights that must be considered when judging the optimal structure of 
private resource flow ownership. Eggertsson (1990) defines these four bundles of property rights as 
follows: 
Use right (UR) - the right to use an asset - defines the potential uses of an asset that are legitimate 
for an individual in order to consume a specific quantity of a resource in a given time, place and type 
of use. 
Change Right (CR) - is the right to change the time, type of use and place of resource, including the 
right to transform the physical structure of the resource. 
Benefit Right (BR) - is the right to get income by temporarily transferring resource use rights. This 
allows individual co-owners to transfer the resource to a third party temporarily while still 
maintaining the ownership right; and  
Sell Right (SR) - refers to the right to permanently transfer ownership rights over an asset to a third 
party. 
Of course, the delineation of private rights over a resource flow is not costless; the optimal structure 
of a property rights system that contains economically relevant bundles of property rights will 
deviate from the ideal to a certain extent. Scholars therefore include other parameters to judge the 
efficiency of a particular  private property rights system. Particularly, following  the work of  property 
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rights theory (Demsetz, 1967, 1969, 1988) and transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975,1985, 
1996), the quality of property right is considered a legitimate parameter to judge the efficiency of a 
particular property rights system (Bromley, 1991). The costless ideal quality of a private property 
right would be to maintain all economically relevant bundles of rights to the perfection. In the world 
of positive transaction costs, the same content of rights might result in different qualities of rights 
and have different economic implications and might therefore be subjected to economic analysis. 
Resource System Rights (RSR) 
It is important to distinguish between two types of ownership within the communal resource system 
rights. The physical boundaries of the group’s ownership are a private property right for the group. It 
can be considered as the maximum boundaries of ownership that determine the action and behavior 
of individual co-owners. It can be defined as the relationship between the group and the rest of the 
society with regards to the resource system under consideration. Thus, by considering how the 
attenuation of these basic bundles of regulative rights affect the outcome of the collective decisions, 
we can identify three classes of consolidated proprietorship to a common pool resource system in 
which all owners hold or do not hold all three bundles of rights (e.g. management right owners, 
exclusion right owners and alienation right owners). These differ with regards to the degree of 
regulative rights. For an empirical analysis - instead of focusing on one type of consolidated decision 
making rights over a CPR system - it is therefore more useful to define the three types of 
consolidated communal proprietorship as alternatives that need to be compared to the ideal 
consolidation ownership. 
Beside the external relationship, the opportunistic behavior of co-owners needs to be controlled. We 
argue that if opportunistic behavior is to be controlled within the group, all co-owners must have 
both the right to control the decision of other co-owners and sufficient incentives not to depart from 
the optimal decision. To this end, all co-owners within a particular communal proprietorship must 
possess all essential bundles of regulative rights (management, exclusion and alienation) that are 
susceptible to opportunism. These bundles of regulative rights held by co-owners define the 
ownership boundaries of co-owners within the group, if the objective is to study how bargaining 
among co-owners results in a Pareto-optimal decision. By considering how the distribution and the 
attenuation of these basic regulative rights affect the bargaining behavior of co-owners within the 
group, it becomes possible to secure new insights into the behavior of various types of co-ownership 
to a resource system. In this view, we can define three classes of co-owners where all co-owners 
may hold or not hold the three essential bundles of clearly delimited and equal regulative rights (e.g. 
claimant co-owners, appropriator co-owner and co-owners). 
Management Rights Owners Proprietorship refers to co-owners operating under management group 
rights. Typical examples of this type of rights arrangement can be found in self-organized communal 
proprietorships. The ownership of decision-making rights over the management of the resource 
system is vested in a group. Individual co-owners have both the right to participate and the 
obligation to contribute to the maintenance and operation of the resource system. Under ideal 
conditions, in this communal proprietorship system, all co-owners are granted equal rights to decide 
on the size of resource abstraction (resource stock exploitation), to transform the resource system by 
making improvements or otherwise altering the nature of the resource system and to determine how 
associated economic and non-economic benefits or costs are to be distributed within the property 
system. According to Ostrom’s property rights classification (2000), these co-owners can be labeled 
as a claimant co-owners since they are granted a decision-making power over a resource system, 
with regards to the construction and maintenance of facilities and have the authority to devise limits 
on the rate of resource stock extraction. In this system, both co-owners and the group do not have 
the right to determine who may access the resource system and harvest it. 
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This type of communal proprietorship may be important for resource systems which are susceptible 
to appropriation externality (e.g. fish stock, ground water), non-renewable resources (e.g. oil, 
mineral stock) and common pool resource systems which require periodic maintenance and 
investment (e.g. irrigation systems). For those resource systems, management rights are of critical 
importance to sustain the flow of resource units or benefits and hence to bargain over collective 
decisions regarding the management of the resource system. 
Proprietorship of Exclusion Rights Owners refers to the consolidation of decision-making over 
exclusion. It grants collective exclusion rights to the group in addition to collective management 
rights. The collective exclusion rights provide the group with the security to keep the benefits from 
the collective investment. Co-owners operating in this system can refer to those proprietor co-
owners, who possess equal rights to determine who will have what access or withdrawal rights from 
the resource system, on what terms decision-making rights over the resource system will be granted, 
and how these rights may be transferred to third parties. This determines to what extent non-
members or non-right holders can be excluded from the use of and decisions about a CPR. These 
exclusion rights of co-owners provide incentives and self-enforce multilateral bargaining over “the 
rules of exclusion” and sanction mechanism. This classification has been widely used in the study of 
CPRs in order to explain the relationship between individual rights and the efficiency of bargaining 
over rules of exclusion and sanction mechanisms. 
Proprietorship of Alienation Rights Owners: in addition to management and exclusion rights, the 
proprietorship of alienation right owners grants the group the right to transfer management rights 
over the resource system (e.g. the right to select who provides maintenance of the system and who 
operates within it) as well as exclusion rights (e.g. the right to select who provides exclusion) to 
third parties. This allows the group to select efficient service providers (if they are outside of the 
group) and to control the quality and quantity of services offered by such service providing 
institutions. An example of this is the modern cooperative system. This type of communal 
proprietorship is important for a common pool resource which requires high-tech maintenance and 
equipped power exclusion (e.g. oil or irrigation systems). This in turn determines the negotiation 
power of the group as a decision-making unit about the market allocation of resources. A lack of 
alienation rights restricts the group insofar as it does not get the possibility to transfer the 
management and exclusion of the resource system outside of the group. 
Under ideal conditions, co-owners operating under communal proprietorship of alienation rights 
have the right to transfer (temporarily or permanently) the decision-making rights over management 
and exclusion to group members or bequest them to their family. The right to sell or lease either 
management or exclusion rights allows co-owners to decide on the rule of rights transfer within or 
outside of the group. 
The threefold classification of communal proprietorship is based on the content of regulative rights 
and rests on two assumptions: (a) an equitable distribution of co-owners’ rights within the property 
boundaries of the group, and (b) a zero-cost consolidated decision-making. If the transaction cost is 
positive, the distribution and the quality of the essential bundles of regulative rights define the 
ownership boundaries of the group of owners of the resource system. Moreover, it is precisely the 
analysis of changes in the content, distribution and quality of these regulative rights that requires 
detailed investigation, if the objective is to search for optimal boundaries of communal 
proprietorship. This requires developing a flexible framework that captures both the variability in the 
distribution of co-owners’ rights and the cost of decision-making. 
Quality of a Property Rights System 
To examine the economics of the quality of rights, economists have tried to find out what quality 
parameters govern the structure of an efficient property right and developed a set of quality 
parameters   for   property  rights   which  would  ensure  optimality  in terms of  ownership  under a 
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perfectly competitive market. In this line, Posner (1977) suggests universality, exclusivity and 
transferability as three quality parameters to judge the efficiency of a private property rights system 
for the market to operate. Randall (1987) proposes four parameters for efficient allocation of 
resources: private property rights ought to be complete, exclusive, transferable and enforceable. 
Tietenberg (1992) identifies four parameters as pre-conditions. They are similar to Randall’s 
suggestion, but contain more clarifications. In property rights literature, these quality parameters are 
referred to as ‘characteristics of property rights’. 
Tietenberg (1992: 45-6) defines the four quality parameters as follows: 
• Universality - all resources are privately owned, and all entitlements are completely 
specified;  
• Exclusivity - all benefits and costs resulting from the ownership and usage of the resource 
should accrue to the owner, and solely to the owner, either directly or indirectly or by sale 
to a third party; 
• Transferability - all property rights should be transferable from one owner to another in a 
voluntary exchange; and 
• Enforceability - others should secure a property right from involuntary seizure or 
encroachment. This parameter is used to measure the security of a right. 
Under ideal conditions (presuming no transaction costs), an optimal structure for private property 
rights which is compatible to a resource flow must have four completely specified, exclusive, 
transferable and enforceable bundles of privately owned property rights. In the case of positive 
transaction costs however, a comprehensive framework should take this fact into account. Different 
resources might need a different degree of security, specification, exclusion and transferability, 
depending on the characteristics of a resource and its objective function. Each quality variable has 
different economic implications similar to bundles of use rights. Hence, like any other commodity, 
the value of any exchanged bundle of rights depends, ceteris paribus, on the quality of the bundle of 
rights that is conveyed in a particular property rights system. 
As we can see from Figure 1.1, a property rights system for the management of a common pool 
resource is said to be complete if it contains 4 bundles of use rights and 3 bundles of regulative 
rights (decision- making rights). Under ideal conditions (no transaction costs), the optimal boundary 
of a quasi-private property rights system for CPRs comprises two complete property rights sub-
systems, i.e. a property rights system for the resource flow (henceforth, the use rights system or URS) 
and a property rights system for the resource system (henceforth, the regulative rights system or 
RRS). 
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Fig. 1.1: Combination Framework for Resource Flow Rights and Resource System Rights 
 
A shared property rights system for CPRs which does not contain one of the above mentioned 
bundles of rights is considered to be an inefficient property rights system for the management of all 
common problems. From the framework, one can argue that the optimal boundaries of CPR 
ownership are entirely dependant on: i) the number of bundles of use rights over a resource flow; ii) 
the number of bundles of regulative rights over a resource system; iii) the quality of the bundles of 
use and regulative rights; and iv) the aggregation of the systems for use rights and regulative rights 
in the total system. The optimal structure of a CPR rights system is more complex than resource flow 
rights and resource system rights in the sense that it considers the interrelation between the two 
rights systems. Our emphasis below is on the fourth point (iv), i.e. on the incentives associated with 
different types of combinations of the two rights systems under ideal conditions. 
By considering how the attenuation of the private property rights over a resource flow and 
communal property rights over basic bundles of resource flow use rights and resource system rights 
affects the action and the behavior of CPR right owners, it becomes possible to examine the 
economic incentives by analyzing various types of combinations between private and communal 
property rights systems. Based on the above framework, we can define 12 alternative types of 
combinations of resource flow and resource system rights. All individual co-owners in the property 
rights system may hold well-defined and enforced property rights that include (or do not include) all 
four bundles of equal use rights over a resource flow and all the three bundles of co-equal regulative 
rights over a resource system (Table 1.1). The table shows a matrix of alternative combinations of 
the two rights systems. 
Based on the above framework, we can define 12 alternative types of combinations of resource flow 
and resource system rights. All individual co-owners in the property rights system may hold well-
defined and enforced property rights that include (or do not include) all four bundles of equal use 
rights over a resource flow and all the three bundles of co-equal regulative rights over a resource 
system (Table 1.1). The table shows a matrix of alternative combinations of the two rights systems. 
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Table 1.1: Matrix of Alternative Combinations of Bundles of Resource Flow Rights and Resource System Rights 
 Resource flow rights (type of tenure system) 
Resource System Rights  
(Decision-Making Rights) 
Use Rights 
(U) 
Change 
Rights (C) 
Benefit 
Rights (B) 
Sell Rights 
(S) 
Management (M) MU MC MB MS 
Exclusion (E) EU EC EB ES 
Alienation (A) AU AC AB AC 
 
The above table indicates 12 possible rights systems for resource flows (tenure systems) and for 
resource systems. The management-use type (MU) represents a property rights system that contains 
the minimum number of attenuated resource flow and resource system rights. The alienation-sell 
type (AC) is a property rights system that contains the maximum number of attenuated bundles of 
resource flow and resource system rights. This is an ideal case where all individuals hold seven 
completely specified, exclusive, transferable and enforceable bundles of rights. The economic 
implication of each rights system is similar to the explanation for each bundle of rights in the 
previous section. The combination of the two rights systems only improves the quality of the existing 
bundles of rights and hence, presuming no transaction costs, this variable is not relevant for an 
economic analysis. 
From the above, we argue that theoretically, there is only one set of socially optimal property rights 
system for shared rights that foster democratic use and management of shared water resources. 
When the society’s property rights structure is at the point of the social optimum, there is an 
equitable relation and an efficient structure of interactions; individuals are in a state of cooperative 
behavior. Under these conditions, the use of a CPR is optimized and a water sharing society is in its 
most efficient, equitable and stable mode. Alternatively, a socially optimal property rights structure 
to water resources leads to relations among water users generating the most equitable wealth 
distribution from shared resources and to positive outcomes of water-induced conflicts. Any 
deviation from the socially optimal rights structure is considered to be socially sub-optimal. Because 
of the shared nature of rights, the social optimality of shared property systems is considered Pareto 
sub-optimal: there is an alternative restructuring of the society’s rights that would make all its 
members better off without making any worse-off. 
4.2.2. Actual Measurements for Empirical Analyses 
For actual measurements, the social optimality of a particular rights arrangement is dependant on 
the structure of individual members’ ownership rights within the system, since the total rights are 
nothing but a conglomeration of different individual rights. Thus, the social optimality of a particular 
property rights system is measured in terms of the sum of individual owners’ concentration of rights. 
The concentrations of total rights that derive from outcomes in models based on fully defined social 
property rights systems are sub-optimal. We measure an individual co-owner’s concentration of 
rights on the basis of his/her perception of the number of bundles of rights and associated quality 
parameters he/she holds within the society. 
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Accordingly, we use the following formula to calculate the different rights efficiency indices of co-
owners that capture both bundles of rights and associated quality parameters. The ratio of the 
expected value of a property rights system and the actual current value of a property rights system is 
given by 
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
=
== n
i
isis
n
i
itit
ts
QPBR
QPBR
EPRi
1
1
      (1.2) 
where EPRits is a measure of the efficiency of a property rights system for the ith farm, BRit and QPit 
represent the basket of bundles of rights (use rights or regulative rights) and associated quality 
parameters held by the ith co-owner at the time of interview. BRis and QPis stand for the bundles of 
rights and associated quality parameters that a co-owner is expected to be granted by the system. 
The value ∑ ∑
= =
n
i i
itit QPBR
1
4
1
, for which the index is calculated, is referred to as the “current value 
of the rights system”. Similarly, the value of ∑ ∑
= =
n
i i
isis QPBR
1
4
1
 is the reference value of a rights 
system used as “the best rights system” according to the expectations of the co-owners. We can use 
the same formula to disaggregate the total efficiency indices into components, i.e. without a loss of 
generality; s and t may then refer to the expected and actual values of use rights or regulative rights 
of the total rights system. 
Thus, considering individual co-owners’ rights as units aggregating or disaggregating a property 
rights system is very valuable in order to understand the structure of the total rights system and its 
elements. One of the specificities of the framework is that it provides an individual perspective of the 
processes through which social interaction is influenced, where the vested interests of co-owners 
and potential distributional conflicts are taken into account. This framework helps to explain why 
cooperation among parties in conflict is impeded, undemocratic use of social resources and 
inefficient decision-making processes persist and an inefficient property system is tolerated. 
Below, we use this framework to measure the social optimality and the quality of the prevailing 
rights system for shared irrigation water in Ethiopia. No water rights reform takes place on a blank 
slate: in every case, some form of claims or rights over water have already been established through 
traditional procedures, sponsored by private actors, NGOs or the government. Therefore, it is 
important to assess the social optimality of the existing property rights system before attempting to 
enact a new system. This gives us exact answers about the direction and magnitude of a reform 
required to achieve the desired outcome with minimum costs and less negative consequences in 
terms of distribution. 
4.3 Data Sources, Data Collection Methods and Sampling 
The diversity of institutional arrangements for shared irrigation water across the different regional 
states of Ethiopia is striking. They are different in hydrological, institutional and organizational terms 
as well as in terms of content, quantity and distribution of bundles of rights. Given the vastness of 
the country and the diversity of institutions linked to irrigation water rights across regional states, it 
is however very difficult, at least in this research context, to cover all regimes of property rights over 
irrigation water in the country. 
In order to improve the generalizability of the findings, we have collected data from three districts of 
the Amhara state in Ethiopia: the Bure  district in  the West Gojam zone, the Banja district in the Awi  
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zone and the Fogerra district in the South Gonder zone (Map 2.1). The three districts were selected 
on the basis of pre-set criteria, which include the existence of a diversity of institutional 
arrangements for irrigation water, an experience of irrigation and a presence of irrigated agricultural 
production in the region. The data used in this paper was obtained from the author’s surveys in the 
three districts conducted in 2006 and aiming to identify the social structure of shared irrigation 
property rights under different institutional arrangements for water use and its consequential 
performance impacts. Twelve shared irrigation systems were carefully selected from the three 
districts, based on their varying structure of social property rights regarding the use and 
management of irrigation systems. The water source inventory carried out in 2006 by the regional 
state provided a sampling framework for classifying irrigation systems based on their institutional, 
organizational, technological and hydrological differences. 
Map 2.1 
 
We have collected data both at the societal and at the individual levels. To collect data at the 
irrigation level or societal level, the study primarily relied on community workshops, group 
discussions, reviews of bylaws and key informants. To this aim, we organized 12 community 
workshops (with 25-32 participants) and 24 group discussions (with 8-12 participants), reviewed 6 
written bylaws and conducted 60 interviews with key informants in order to collect data about 
internal and external factors influencing the choice of certain institutional arrangements and to 
identify the elements of property rights found in all institutional arrangements for irrigation water 
rights; these comprise bundles of rights, enforcement mechanisms, origins of rights, practices for the 
initial allocation of rights and management. The data obtained from the groups was used to explore 
and compare social interaction and variability in cooperation, vulnerability, risk and conflict 
associated with the irrigation water structure, so as to understand under what conditions different 
institutions co-exist and to examine what factors determine the shape of an institutional 
arrangement. 
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To collect data at the level of individual farms, the study primarily relied on experimental (actual 
recorded data to collect inputs and outputs) and structured interviews with individual farmers. Their 
aim was to collect individual farmers’ perceptions about the concentration of use rights and 
regulative rights they held in the institutional arrangements under which they were operating. Due 
to the lack of data about the population of the users, we compiled a new list of users across the 12 
selected shared irrigation systems. To capture the asymmetry between users along the same 
irrigation system, we divided the total population of each scheme into three sub-samples (upper, 
middle and end users group). To randomly select a sample size of 30 individuals from each irrigation 
system, we first divided the total population (N) into three, N=3n, where n is the total population of 
the sub-samples in each position; we then randomly selected 10 irrigators from each sub-sample 
population n. In this way, a total of 360 onion-cultivating farmers (30 from each irrigation system) 
were randomly selected. This data was used to understand the structure and distribution of actual 
rights of co-owners and to value the perception of users about the initial contract. Individual level 
data was further used to make a comparative analysis of the different institutional arrangements 
and of the resulting performance effects. 
4.4 Social Optimality of Irrigation Water Rights in the Study Area 
We used a normative economics approach to answer the following questions:  
• Are the existing rights systems for shared irrigation water efficient?  
• If not, how serious is the inefficiency? 
• Are the different elements of property rights structured optimally? 
These empirical questions were used to evaluate the overall social optimality of existing shared 
rights systems in the study areas. For this analysis, we used the framework developed in section 2. 
To examine the efficiency of property rights of individual rights holders in the examined communal 
arrangements for irrigation water rights, we collected data from five different types of communal 
arrangements from 12 irrigation systems. Each of the 360 co-owners was asked about his/her 
perception of the rights he/she held with regards to the number of bundles of rights and associated 
quality parameters at the period of the survey and compared to his/her expectations about the best 
possible rights arrangement. Individual co-owners were asked a direct question about the number of 
bundles of use and regulative rights they perceived had been granted to them by the system. They 
were further asked to evaluate the quality of each bundle of rights they had acquired in the system, 
on the basis of four quality parameters expressed on a scale from 1 to 5: a score of 1 to 5 was 
assigned to the quality of a right (5 for excellent, 4 for very good, 3 for good, 2 for poor and 1 for no 
bundle of rights). We then used the formula developed in equation (1.2) to aggregate the quality 
and quantity vectors of rights values into a single unit. 
In this way, we established a property rights efficiency index to measure the deviation from the ideal 
rights arrangements, i.e. the arrangement considered best by the co-owners themselves. If the total 
property rights concentration index value equates to 1, this means that all individual co-owners have 
absolute quasi-private property rights. The central idea is that an equilibrium-efficient system of 
quasi-private property rights is reached when the process of re-adjustment is completed and when 
no further restructuring or re-allocation of rights make some collectives better off without making 
others worse off. 
The computed average, maximum, minimum and standard deviations of the total concentration of 
rights for the whole sample are presented in Table 3.1. As indicated in the table, the mean value of 
total rights concentrations of co-owners is 0.425 for the total sample. This figure implies that the 
mean rights concentration for the whole sample is by nearly 58% lower than the ideal rights concen- 
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tration. From this, one can safely conclude that a reorganization of rights would substantially 
improve the performance of irrigation management in Ethiopia, and particularly in the study area. 
The gap between the ideal and actual measures and the 58% inefficiency in the case study area 
would imply that a massive reform of irrigation water rights is required at the communal level so as 
to substantially improve the performance of community-managed irrigation systems in the country. 
The computed average, maximum, minimum and standard deviations of the composition of the 
aggregated rights system in terms of concentration indices for use and regulative rights are 
presented in Table 3.1. As the table clearly shows, the mean values for the concentration of use 
rights, regulative rights and total rights of co-owners were 0.525, 0.375 and 0.425, respectively. 
These figures imply that the mean rights concentrations of use rights, regulative rights and total 
rights for the whole sample are lower by nearly 50%, 60% and 58% respectively than the ideal 
concentrations. The table also shows that the mean concentration of regulative rights for the total 
sample (0.375) is lower than the mean concentration for use rights (0.525), indicating that the 
problem of regulative rights is more severe than the problem of use rights in the study area. 
Table 3.1: Concentration Indices for Use rights, Regulative Rights and Rights Quality with Respect to the Total 
Sample of Farms, the RRO farms and the URO Farms 
 Mean Max Min St.D 
# of 
Farms 
Total Sample      360 
Use Rights System Con. 0.525 0.725 0.050 0.123  
Regulative Rights System Con. 0.375 0.800 0.200 0.233  
Total Rights System Con. 0.425 0.757 0.014 0.165  
Overall Quality Index  0.55 0.90 0.20 0.234  
RRO Farms     185 
Use Rights Con. 0.725 0.825 0.250 0.112  
Regulative Rights Con. 0.675 0.800 0.200 0.198  
Total Rights Con. 0.634 0.814 0.289 0.155  
Overall Quality Index 0.75 0.90 0.30 0.211  
URO Farms      175 
Use Rights Con. 0.475 0.675 0.050 0.143  
Regulative Rights Con. - - -   
Total Rights Con. 0.45 0.675 0.050 0.143  
Overall Quality Index 0.35 0.75 0.20 0.243  
The mean values of the four parameters for quality measurement with respect to each bundle of use 
and regulative rights are presented below in radar graph 3.1. The mean value of the quality 
parameters indicates that the  overall quality  of sell rights is the poorest, followed  by benefit rights,  
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change rights and use rights in the total sample. Similarly, the overall mean value of alienation 
rights is the poorest, followed by exclusion rights and management rights. The radar graph further 
indicates that the quality of the total rights system is decreasing as we move from use to sell rights 
in the use rights system and from management to alienation rights in the regulative rights system. 
The dual implication of this observation is the following: the higher the number of bundles of use 
rights and regulative rights, the better will be the overall quality of a use rights system or a 
regulative rights system, and hence, the higher will be the overall quality of the total rights system. 
In other words, it indicates that the quality and quantity elements of rights are directly proportional. 
Graph 3.1: Quality Demission of the Total Sample with Respect to the Four Quality Parameters 
 
The whole exercise above confirms that the current supply of irrigation water rights through 
communal proprietorship in the region is highly inefficient. The value of the total rights 
concentration index indicates that the country should undertake a massive property rights reform, if 
the objective is to bring about substantial changes in the management of the irrigation systems. 
According to these results, one could argue that the growth of irrigated agriculture in the country is 
blocked by the weakness of institutional arrangements at a communal level, which fail to provide 
co-owners with effective and efficient rights that allow for decentralized decision-making. 
The efficiency values above enables us to use different ways of disaggregating a total property rights 
system according to the structure of co-owners’ rights in the system. In the following step, using 
these efficiency indices, we detect missing property elements and structural elements of rights in the 
studied water rights arrangements and propose general policy recommendations aimed at improving 
the efficiency of shared rights arrangements. The two key areas linked with the inefficiency of shared 
rights arrangements are property elements and structural elements of rights. Below, we discuss each 
of them separately. 
4.4.1. Property Elements of Water Rights 
Although we primarily discuss community-managed arrangements for irrigation water rights as a 
single type of property rights regime, there is substantial variability between individual’s co-owners’ 
rights, both in terms of numbers of bundles of rights and in terms of associated quality parameters 
(property rights elements). Based on the review of the 12 above mentioned written bylaws dealing 
with community managed irrigation systems, as well as on discussions about verbal bylaws with key  
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informants, community workshops and group discussions, we have identified five distinct types of 
institutional arrangements for irrigation water rights in the study area. These are the following: 
unregulated communal (URC), privately regulated communal (PRC), state-regulated communal 
(SRC), group- regulated communal (GRC) and corporation-regulated communal (CRC) arrangements. 
They differ in terms of the number of bundles of rights and in terms of associated quality 
parameters. The number of bundles of use rights and regulative rights of the different property rights 
arrangements are presented in Table 3.2. The table shows us that, as we move from unregulated 
communal to corporation-regulated communal, the content of property rights are improving in two 
ways: i) the number of bundles of use rights moves from “no exclusive use rights” to “sell rights”; 
and ii) the number of bundles of regulative rights moves from “no regulative rights” to “alienation 
rights”. 
Out of the five types of common arrangements for irrigation water rights in the region, three are 
community-driven institutional arrangements: unregulated communal, group regulated-communal 
and corporation-regulated communal arrangements. They are different in terms of numbers of 
bundles of use and regulative rights, as well as in terms of equity of use and regulative rights 
distribution. Unregulated communal arrangements are an extreme case where there are no use and 
regulative rights. Corporation-regulated communal arrangements are the other extreme case, where 
all bundles of use and regulative rights are granted. Group-regulated communal lies between 
corporate-communal and unregulated communal. It consists of two bundles of regulative rights 
(management and exclusion rights) and three bundles of use rights (use, change and benefit rights). 
As compared to state-driven and privately driven institutional arrangements, users of community-
driven systems were fairly satisfied by the establishment of different types of institutional 
arrangements based on local conditions, usage technologies and external environments. 
Table 3.2: Bundles of Use and Regulative Rights with Respect to Types of Water Rights Arrangements 
Bundles of Use Rights 
 
Bundles of Regulative Rights 
 
Type of 
Rights 
Arrange- 
ments 
Use Rights Change 
Rights 
Benefit 
Rights 
Sell 
Rights 
Mgt 
Rights  
Exclusion 
Rights 
 Alienation 
Rights  
URC        
PRC x       
SRC x x   x   
GRC x x x  x x  
CRC x x x x x x x 
             Source: Author’s summary of community workshops and group discussions 
The two other arrangements, state-regulated communal and privately regulated communal are set 
up by the state or by private investors, respectively. All state-regulated arrangements are more or 
less similar, both in terms of the content of use and regulative rights and in terms of the distribution 
of rights. According to the bylaw about state-regulated communal rights arrangements, the rights 
system grants two bundles of use rights (use rights and change rights) and one bundle of regulative 
rights   (management   rights)   to   co-owners.  In  a  state-regulated   communal   arrangement,   all 
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co-owners do not have equal management rights; parts of the management rights (those dealing 
with use rights) are assigned to a few individual co-owners (leaders of water-user associations), 
whilst the remaining management rights are exercised by the group of co-owners as a whole. In the 
case of privately regulated communal arrangements, farmers have clearly specified and exclusive, 
crop-specific use rights only. Depending on the type of contract, farmers are allowed to use the 
water to irrigate one or two types of crops. The decision about which crop to produce is largely 
determined by the water owner (the private investor). In this way, water owners not only have the 
power to influence decisions about water allocation, but also the production process and production 
choices. No regulative rights are granted to farmers under private communal arrangements. 
The above classification of institutional arrangements based on number of bundles of rights only 
indicates the content of property rights associated with each property rights arrangement. Based on 
content of rights, it is hard to judge whether one property rights arrangement is superior to the 
others. It only indicates the content of property rights elements at status quo or as established by 
the initial contract; it does not show us the current status of the institutional arrangements. A 
complete property rights element of a particular property rights arrangement necessarily involves at 
least two sets of parameters: the number of bundles of property rights (use and regulative) and the 
associated quality parameters. The problem is that quality parameters are subjective and not 
observable for immediate classification. Their analysis requires using some subjective judgment, as 
well as data about individual perceptions and about the quality of a particular property rights 
arrangement. 
For this particular purpose, we separately determined the quality of each rights arrangement for 
irrigation water, regardless of the number of bundles of use and of regulative rights granted in each 
institutional arrangement. We used randomly selected sample farms (60 from each water rights 
arrangement) to develop a quality index for property rights. Accordingly, information on individuals` 
perceptions of the quality of the rights system for irrigation water use and of the regulative rights 
system that a farmer was operating under were determined by submitting questionnaires at a farm 
level. We then constructed the indices for the quality of rights of a property rights system. This was 
done regardless of hierarchy and of the number of use and regulative rights, but was based on the 
farmers` perceptions of the quality of irrigation water rights they had acquired with respect to the 
four quality parameters (degree of rights specification, excludability, security and transferability). A 
score of 1 to 5 was assigned to the quality of each parameter: 1 for bad quality, 2 for poor quality, 3 
for moderate quality, 4 for very good quality and 5 for excellent quality. The index for the quality of 
the total property rights system (t) of the ith farm relative to the score of the best quality rights 
system (s) is computed as: 
∑
∑
=
ijs
ijt
tsi
jR
jR
q  
where qtsi is the quality of irrigation water rights acquired by i
th farm at the time of interview, Rijt is 
the quality score of the jth quality parameter for the ith farm and Rijs is the score of the best quality 
rights of the jth quality parameter. 
The mean, maximum, minimum values and the standard deviation of the estimated quality for 
irrigation water right arrangements are presented in Table 3.3. According to the table, URC exhibited 
the highest quality, followed by PRC, GRC and SRC. The lowest quality could be observed in URC. 
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Table 3.3: Quality indices associated with property rights arrangements 
Type of rights arrangement Mean Max Min St.d  
Unregulated communal (URC) 0.25 0.35 0.05 0.31 
Privately regulated communal (PRC) 0.825 0.90 0.75 0.097 
State-regulated communal (SRC) 0.55 0.625 0.215 0.14 
Group-regulated communal (GRC) 0.75 0.825 0.675 0.11 
Corporation-regulated communal (CRC) 0.825 0.95 0.725 0.084 
Once the quantity and quality parameters were determined, we were able to make comparative 
analyses of the rights arrangements. As the above results confirmed, the aforementioned 
institutional arrangements can be considered as different institutional arrangements, since they 
show significant and consistent differences both in terms of sets of property rights elements and in 
terms of quality and quantity of bundles of rights. This implies that individuals operating under these 
institutional arrangements can be considered to be operating in different institutional environments 
for the purpose of a comparative analysis. 
Successful institutional arrangements for property rights are naturally evaluated in terms of the 
enforcement of property rules and norms that allow for the continued development of property rules. 
Thus, we can examine the effectiveness of the institutional arrangements by providing individual co-
owners with efficient and effective property rights. For empirical analyses, it can be measured in 
terms of the concentration of individual co-owners’ rights, which is the aggregation of the number of 
bundles of rights and of their respective quality parameters (equation 3.1). The computed use rights 
concentrations of individuals operating under different institutional arrangements are presented in 
Graph 3.1. 
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The graph shows us that co-owners operating under corporation-regulated communal arrangements 
have the highest concentration of use rights, followed by group-regulated communal, state-
regulated communal and privately regulated communal arrangements. Co-owners operating under 
unregulated communal arrangements have the lowest use rights concentration. It can also be 
observed that the gaps in terms of co-owners’ use rights concentrations between unregulated 
communal, privately regulated communal and state-regulated communal arrangements seems to be 
narrow. A wider gap can be observed between the two best institutional arrangements (CRC and 
GRC) and the three other institutional arrangements (SRC, PRC and URC). The smoothness of the 
lines also suggests a wider variability of co-owners’ rights within the same type of institutional 
arrangement; this variability is very high in the case of the two best institutional arrangements. 
Based on this, one can conclude that group-regulated rights arrangements for communal irrigation 
water systems are superior to other institutional arrangements. They provide all co-owners with 
decentralized decision-making powers with regards to property rights, which allow individual co-
owners to hold securely as many sticks in the bundle of property rights as they desire. 
It is important to note that the above analysis gives us a clear picture of feasible interventions, in the 
sense that different institutional arrangements demand different policy measures. Considering all 
communal rights arrangements as a single type of rights arrangement may lead to policy 
recommendations of a massive property rights reform at the communal level, which may be 
inconsistent, or even contra-productive given existing institutional, social, economic and 
environmental conditions. As a result, a reform launched in the name of property rights may result in 
real risks rather than in improvements. Even if it fits the existing social and institutional conditions, it 
may not be efficient from an economic point of view. This is due to the fact that the same result can 
be obtained with minimal interventions (improving only the missing elements of the rights 
arrangements), without the need for a massive reform of the resource domain. 
4.4.2. Structural Elements of Property Rights 
In our framework, we have seen that three principal structural ares of property rights are of 
paramount importance to explain the deviations from the ideal property rights structure: i) the 
distribution of use rights and regulative rights, ii) the bundling of use rights and regulative rights, 
and iii) the aggregation of the systems of use rights and of regulative rights. In order to understand 
the sources of structural inefficiency and the magnitude of effects of each structural element, it is 
therefore important to at least estimate separate efficiency indices for the two types of rights (use 
and regulative). This enables us to examine the bundling of rights and their effects on farms 
operating under different institutional arrangements, so as to examine the aggregation of the two 
rights systems. The equity of the distribution of rights can be estimated for a single rights 
arrangement on the basis of the concentration distribution of individual rights within the system. 
Aggregations of Use and Regulative Rights 
For the aggregation analysis, we distinguished two types of farms: farms of regulative rights owners 
(thereafter: RRO farms) and farms of use rights owners (thereafter: URO farms). We divided our total 
sample into URO and RRO farms. The computed average, maximum, minimum and standard 
deviation of the composition of the aggregated rights system - in terms of use and regulative rights 
concentration indices for RRO farms and URO farms - are presented in Table 3.1. The average 
concentrations of regulative rights and use rights were found to be 0.675 and 0.725 for RRO farms. 
URO farms have no regulative rights; their mean use rights concentration was 0.475. The use rights 
concentration indices of URO farms were ranging from 0.050 to 0.675. A comparison across the two 
types of farms indicates that the average use rights concentration of RRO farms equates to 2/3 of the 
average concentration of URO farms. This observation can lead to the expectation that the average 
RRO farm is operating under a better institutional arrangement than the average URO farm and thus 
seems to exhibit better multilateral bargaining and Pareto efficiency outcomes. The standard 
deviation,   minimum  and  maximum  values of  the  rights concentration in  Table  3.1  suggest  the  
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existence of wider rights concentration variability (inequality of rights distribution) among co-owners 
across the three types of samples. The efficiency differences regarding property rights between the 
two types of farms can be explained in terms of sub-optimal aggregation of the two rights systems.  
The relation between use and regulative rights can be explained in terms of an imbalance of the 
bargaining power: the lower the regulative rights concentration, the higher the difficulty of 
multilateral bargaining over the “rules of the game” aimed at improving the efficiency and security 
of use rights. Thus, a poor aggregation of regulative rights increases the opportunistic behavior of 
users in the provision of irrigation water, inefficient supply of use rights and problems over-
appropriation. The effects of the concentration of use rights can be explained in a similar manner: 
the lower the concentration of use rights, the lower the gain from the resource and, thus the lower 
the incentives to invest time and efforts for bargaining over the rules and the collective investment. 
This in turn affects the transfer of water from an inefficient usage sector/user to a more efficient 
usage sector/user. 
Bundling of Vectors of Use Rights and Regulative Rights 
The above indices give us a general picture about the efficiency of the aggregated property rights of 
the total system and its two sub-systems (use rights system and regulative rights system). Further 
disaggregating the total system into its vectors of bundles of use rights and regulative rights may 
help us to address some important questions like ‘what determines the content of the efficiency of a 
property rights system?’ and ‘which components of rights have more influence on the direction and 
magnitude of the efficiency and equity of distribution in the system?’ Besides understanding the 
effects of each bundle of rights on the structure of the total rights system, it is important to note that 
property rights are a complex collection of separable bundles of rights that can be shared among 
many users. Each bundle of use rights can be held separately: use rights can for instance be held 
separately from change rights or from sell rights. Similarly, each bundle of regulative rights can be 
assigned separately or in a cumulative form to a single individual or to a group. This would imply 
that the way in which each bundle of use rights and regulative rights is bundled in order to form a 
property rights system has implications on the system’s economic efficiency. 
We measure the structure of bundling on the basis of the composition and concentration of each 
bundle of use rights (use, change, benefit and sell) and regulative rights (management, exclusion 
and alienation), measured with respect to the associated quality parameters, i.e.: i) the degree of 
rights specification (Dsp), ii) the degree of rights transferability (Drt), iii) the degree of rights 
exclusion (Dex) and iv) the degree of rights security (Dse) (as presented in Figure 3.4). The values 
obtained from individual respondents for the different bundles of rights are presented on the radar 
graph below (for the total sample). The radar graph systematically represents the relationship 
between each component of a property rights system and its associated quality parameters. The 
shaded areas represent the commutative concentration value of each bundle of rights held by an 
individual co-owner from the total sample in terms of four quality parameters ranging from a 
minimum concentration (a value of one) to a maximum concentration (a value of 5). 
The radar graph shows that the concentration of use rights in the total sample has the highest value 
in the use rights system, followed by change benefit rights and sell rights. Similarly, within the 
regulative rights system, management rights seem to have the highest value, followed by exclusion 
rights and alienation rights. 
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Figure 3.4: Values of Property Rights Concentrations with Respect to Bundles of Use Rights and Regulative 
Rights (for the Total Sample) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure further helps us to compare the different quality parameters of a particular bundle of 
rights. The degree of specification is for instance one of the most severe problems regarding sell 
rights (with a maximum value of 0.18), followed by the degree of exclusion (max. of 0.26), the 
degree of security (max. of 0.3) and the degree of transferability (max. of 0.4). This indicates that 
improving sell rights requires improving those problems in their respective order. It also indicates 
that there is not a large difference between the value of a bundle of use rights and a bundle of 
change rights for the total sample, although the degree of change rights transferability is lower 
(max. value of 0.9) than the degree of use rights transferability (max. value of 1). We can interpret 
the other values in a similar fashion. For instance, for alienation regulative rights, the degree of 
transferability is the most critical problem (max. value of 0.1), followed by the degree of 
specification (max. value of 0.2), the degree of security (max. value of 0.4) and the degree of 
exclusion (max. value of 0.5). The results obtained from the use rights and regulative rights systems 
are consistent with the view that the higher bundle is inclusive of the lower bundle of rights. This 
means that the lower bundle has to be established and enforced first before trying to improve the 
higher bundle of rights. 
A comparison of the composition of the use rights system with respect to the two types of farms 
generally shows that RRO farms have a better concentration of use rights than URO farms regarding 
all bundles of use rights. This means that use rights are better bundled in RRO farms than in URO 
farms. This might be due to the fact that RRO farmers are operating under better institutional 
environments which allow individual co-owners to bargain over use rights and to hold the use rights 
they desire. The value of RRO farms and URO farms are presented in figures 3.5 and 3.6. The value 
of a use rights system across the two types of farms indicates similar results to those of the total 
sample in the sense that the higher the hierarchy of a bundle of rights in the system, the lower its 
contribution to the total system. This means that the concentration of the lower bundle of rights is 
increasing as we move from bundles of use rights (the lowest bundles of rights in the systems) to 
bundles of sell  rights (the highest bundles  of use rights in the system).  The implication  is similar to  
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the above explanation about hierarchy of rights: the lowest bundle of rights has to be granted first 
to in order to be able to grant the higher bundle of rights. 
Figure 3.5: Property Rights Concentration Values with Respect to Bundles of Use Rights for RRO Farms 
 
The differences in the concentration of bundles of rights across the two types of farms can be 
explained in terms of the associated quality parameters. As we can see from figures 3.5 and 3.6, the 
two types of farms are affected by different quality parameters. For RRO farms, for instance, the 
specification of use rights is considered to be the most important problem, followed by insecurity, 
exclusion and transferability, whereas for URO farms, transferability is reported as the most severe 
problem, followed by insecurity, specification and exclusion. The shaded areas indicate the existence 
of variability between co-owners for all four bundles of rights within a farm type and across farm 
types. This might be due to the variability both in terms of the quality parameters of the bundles of 
rights and in terms of the number of bundles of rights held by individual respondents in the system. 
Figure 3.6: Property Rights Concentration Values with Respect to Bundles of Use Rights for URO Farms 
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4.5 Conclusion 
The whole exercise above shows us the efficiency of the current system of irrigation water rights 
through communal arrangements and detects the main sources of inefficiency in the studied rights 
arrangements. The decision whether to improve a particular missing element requires an analysis of 
the demand, since the demand of a particular rights system depends on the type of resource, the 
time, the place, the use and the objective function under consideration. Moreover, improving the 
missing elements of rights has benefits, but also involves costs. The alternative framework (the 
bundle of rights- centered framework) is quite helpful to develop a more in-depth understanding of 
the structure of a property rights system and to compare the efficiency of different institutional 
arrangements. It also helps us to detect the missing elements of rights. Once we understand the 
aggregated structure and its elements, it is straightforward to examine incentives associated with 
the aggregated property rights system and to determine incentives associated with each element of 
property rights. 
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5 Preventing and Managing Natural Resource 
Conflicts in the Sahel. Experiences from  
Helvetas Mali 
Aly Dama10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Malian Western Sahel is located between the Kayes and Koulikoro regions of the Republic of Mali. It 
covers an area of 238,537 square kilometers and has an estimated total population of around 
800’000. Several ethnic groups inhabit the region, namely the Soninké, the Pulaar, the Bambara, the 
Moor and the Diawambé. Administratively, Western Sahel shares its Northern border with the 
Islamic Republic of Mauritania and its North-Eastern border with Senegal. Due to transhumance, the 
conflict dynamics which are the focus of this paper also reached the Southern areas bordering the 
Republic of Guinea (in particular the Kita cercle11 in the Kayes region). 
Agriculture, transhumance and sedentary herding, as well as trade and handicraft are the main 
economic activities of the region. As a zone of encounters and human contacts, Western Sahel has a 
long tradition of co-existence between communities with different, yet complementary, lifestyles and 
production techniques. In the recent past, the region was an important commercial junction 
characterised by social intermingling and trans-Saharan  trade. Today however, the area has become  
 
______________________ 
10  Senior Officer, Programme de prévention et de gestion des conflits liés à l’accès et au contrôle des espaces agro-sylvo-
pastoraux (Pregesco), Helvetas Mali. 
11  Administrative division in Mali. Mali counts eight main regions subdivided in 49 cercles. 
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extremely vulnerable because of severe climatic difficulties and social tensions causing the 
displacement of almost 10% of its population. 
But the social and climatic ruptures have not just caused population displacements. For those who 
stayed, the scarcity of means of subsistence caused by a sharp decrease in production and 
productivity have led, in the course of the last decade, to crises and tensions often developing into 
violent confrontations. These tensions have fuelled feelings of suspicion and mistrust among the 
different ethnic groups living in Western Sahel. 
5.2 Patterns of conflicts in the Malian Sahel 
Cycles of conflicts, followed by cooperation between the users competing for access to key natural 
resources have always been a characteristic of the production systems of Sahel countries. 
Historically, groups of pastoralists and livestock keepers had developed effective systems in order to 
negotiate access to resources and handle rising conflicts among themselves and, to a lesser degree, 
between them and other ethnic groups or systems of productions. 
Presently this does not seem to be the case any longer, since we are witnessing a rise in the 
frequency, but also in the intensity of conflicts about land, trade routes or other resources between 
the different groups of users, as was the case in 1997 and 1999. The situation has become more 
complex since, with the eruption of violent conflicts that seem to have become endemic and chronic 
characteristics of the life of pastoralists - after years of political, economic and social instability. One 
of the main causes for these developments lies certainly in the weakness of our states (with regards 
to border control, security of individuals and goods, and the general institutional framework…), but 
this does not constitute the only element that bears on the access to resources as well as on the 
resolution of resource-related conflicts. 
We have to recognise that the nature of conflicts has evolved. Natural resources are constantly 
becoming scarcer and more scattered over time and space. Customary institutions which enjoyed 
authority in the past have lost of their effectiveness and are being replaced by other forms of power. 
Finally, new, previously unknown, actors have emerged in the context of the crises affecting the 
region (Senegal-Mauritania, Guinea, Sierra Leone…). 
5.3 The implementation procedure of the Helvetas-Mali Conflict 
Prevention and Management Programme 
The aim of the programme is to contribute to the peaceful cohabitation between farmers, livestock 
keepers and shepherds in the transhumance zone. It has four main objectives:  
• Supporting the process of relationship building between actors and favouring its 
organisational and institutional development at local, regional and national levels. 
• Improving the conditions to access and control natural resources for users. 
• Capacity-building in the fields of conflict prevention and management. 
• Reinforcing local actors in their ability to deal with and manage conflict dynamics. 
 
These objectives are pursued through the establishment of four pillars of intervention:  
• Empowerment of consultation frameworks. 
• Communication and information. 
• Accompanying measures. 
• Advocacy / lobbying. 
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The consultation framework is the main pillar around which the other pillars gravitate. The 
framework is established by the Pregesco programme, in collaboration with the various users of 
natural resources. The frameworks derive from existing producers’ organisations and local regulation 
authorities in different locations. They are engaged in preventive actions and conflict management 
at local level, based on existing activities by village committees in this field. There are twenty 
consultation frameworks (spread among the three cercles of Mali) located on the transhumance 
route linking the Islamic Republic of Mauritania in the North to the Republic of Guinea in the South. 
They constitute platforms for exchanges, consultation and negotiation between the different users of 
natural resources. Beyond their preventive action and conflict management activities, these 
organisations host debates about communal development in terms of rational and long-term 
management of natural resources in support of the local communities. These discussions are fuelled 
by the vast diversity of these frameworks and committees composed of farmers’ organisations (both 
male and female), social and occupational groups and village communities. They also offer the 
administration and technical services an adequate platform to implement sectorial policies and 
represent a qualified interlocutor for questions relating to the management of natural resources. 
The aim of the first pillar is therefore to support and empower consultation frameworks and 
committees in their activities in favour of social stability. Since the establishment of these 
frameworks and committees, their members have undertaken several trainings and were given 
numerous tools for effective conflict management. 
The numerous benefits of the conflict prevention and management programme and the decrease of 
mistrust between actors have shown the capacities of the frameworks and committees to prevent 
and manage local conflicts and their legitimacy within their communities. At present, they constitute 
fields of experimentation for activities which will determine the communities’ capacities for the 
transfer of competencies in natural resources management. 
Conflict prevention and management frameworks as well as village committees supported by the 
programme do not, however, cover the complete area of the three cercles. Being local conflict 
prevention and management authorities linked to the access and control of natural resources – and 
hence evolving in a field of competence which is to be transferred to the communities - their action 
has to remain within the boundaries of the competences accepted by these communities. 
The role of consultation frameworks as platforms for mediation, negotiation and reconciliation on 
question relating to the management of natural resources within and between groups is well 
accepted. The frameworks’ actions remain however limited by the lack of resources for the 
implementation of their objectives. For the time being, Pregesco can offer limited support, which is 
however far from meeting all expectations. Certain community councils, recognising the importance 
of their work, are funded through communal budgets. In most cases, the opportunity for such 
financial support more often depends on the goodwill of elected officials than on an annual budget 
planning. This constitutes a weakness in a long term perspective. 
The future challenge for these frameworks is to maintain their neutrality in the negotiation about 
conflicts linked to access and control of resources, but also to appear as a neutral actor to others 
(justice, administration…). 
5.4 Case studies 
First case: A deadly struggle over land 
The case takes place in November 2006 during harvest time in the village of Simby in Western Sahel. 
El Hadji Kane, a shepherd from the neighbouring village, is herding his sheep in surrounding 
pastures, looking for crops left over from the harvest. The animals escape and enter a field belonging  
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to Checkiné Coulibaly whose harvest is not finished yet. The animals destroy large parts of the 
harvest. Once informed, the infuriated farmer returns immediately to his field and starts a heated 
discussion with El Hadji. A bloody fight breaks out between them; El Hadji is transported to the 
hospital, but dies soon after because of the severity of his injuries. 
The mayor took up the case, informing the consultation committee as well as the judicial authorities. 
He expressed the wish that all sides await the conclusions of the local authority which was given the 
responsibility to start negotiations between the parties. This case reminded the incidents of 1997 
which started precisely in the village of Simby and led to more than a hundred casualties, left 
thousand injured and caused important displacement movements as well as two consecutive 
seasons of anarchy and abandonment of fertile lands because of the insecurity the local populations 
were facing. 
Starting the community-based conflict resolution mechanism, the consultation framework analysed 
the situation before engaging in actions in favour of the victims within the community. From a 
violation of the prohibition to graze animals in the vicinity of fields without sufficient guard, the case 
had developed into a tragic incident causing a man’s death. While the date of the release of the 
fields had not passed yet, means of recourse for the claimants existed. 
After two weeks of negotiations, the victims accepted an out-of-court settlement on 24 November. A 
collective declaration was agreed upon, signed by the mayors of both villages, the consultation 
framework as well as the parties to the dispute and announced the following day. A letter was 
addressed to the president of the court before the hearing of the case on 9 January 2007. 
The court’s verdict was the following: 
“ … Given the result of the debates, a sufficient basis for charges against the aforementioned for a 
physical assault on 11 November 2006 in Simbi, resulting in severe injuries […] against Mr. El Hadji 
Kane could be established. The injuries inflicted resulted in the working incapacity of the victim […]; 
Given that the plaintiff renounced his rights to file a suit by written communication on the date of 8 
January 2007,  
For these reasons, [The court] publicly pronounces the following judgement […]:  
The court finds Checkine Coulibaly guilty of the charges laid out against him and sentences him to a 
suspended sentence of three (3) months; notes and acknowledges the withdrawal of Mr. El Hadji 
Kane[…]” 
 
Commentaries: 
A case for manslaughter could have been brought before the criminal court, with all judicial 
implications and potentially negative consequences for the social stability. 
On the basis of an inter-group negotiation supported by the local authorities, the court voluntarily 
left out parts of the case in its conclusions in order to keep the incident on a local level and 
prevent further damage. 
Traditional mechanisms can be effective if they are given adequate means of action. Their solutions 
are based on past, present and future relationships between local actors, dialogue and consensus 
rather than on textbook application of laws which often favour the emergence of a winner-loser 
situation rather than looking for greater social justice. 
The approach chosen for the resolution of this conflict shows the possible interplay between 
grassroots organisations and judicial bodies in order to reach greater social justice as a basis for 
peace and sustainable development. 
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Second case: Mali-Mauritania cross-border meeting in the village of Gogui 
The events of 1997 led to the emergence of a new phenomenon in the Sahel region, caused by the 
porosity of the national borders of Mali. Armed robbers found shelter in the region and started 
launching raids against herds and capturing cattle belonging to sedentary and semi-sedentary 
communities. As a reaction, violent reprisals were carried out against nomad communities 
considered responsible for the attacks. This led to a general confusion affecting all local 
communities. The signing of peace agreements between the communities in August 1998 and the 
establishment of 14 security posts along the border decided by the local and national authorities 
provided an immediate response to the crisis; these decisions could not, however, provide a long-
term solution as long as other factors were not being adequately dealt with. Those other factors 
included namely the access to natural resources by non-residents and border policy issues, which 
were seriously hampering population movements on both sides of the border. 
After several negotiations with both Malian and Mauritanian authorities, a meeting was organised 
in the village of Gogui in December 2005. This meeting offered the communities the opportunity to 
discuss urgent matters affecting the daily lives of the local populations without raising issues 
relating to territorial sovereignty. The issues discussed were the following: 
• Difficulties linked to transhumance (paths, shelters, water points, transhumance 
certificates). 
• Local answers to cross-border robbery. 
• Rraids against herds and thefts at cattle markets. 
• Revitalisation of consultations between villages under the auspices of the consultation 
frameworks. In the past, such cross-border consultations had often been successful in 
handling cross-border issues without the intervention of the national authorities of both 
states. Thus, the institutionalisation of the consultation frameworks as cross-border 
mediation platforms seemed necessary in order to offer a local response to the difficulties 
that had arisen. 
• Translation into local languages and popularisation of Malian and Mauritanian texts 
relating to the management of natural resources. 
In the end, this meeting on a community level raised political issues that then led political decision-
makers to continue the process on a larger scale: the intercommunity space established between ten 
villages from the Mauritarian region of Hods and the ten others from the Malian region of Kayes 
contributes today to perpetuate the dialogue initiated at the meeting through, among others, regular 
meetings of political and administrative decision-makers every six months. 
At present, the aggressions carried out against nomad pastoralists carrying official documents have 
almost disappeared, robbers are being chased even by their fellow countrymen, a programme for the 
maintenance of dust roads was launched by development partners, the institutionalisation of  
consultation between village communities has become a reality and their contribution is considered 
satisfying by their respective populations, communication materials on the management of natural 
resources are now available in local languages and many other initiatives contributing to a more 
harmonious cohabitation between communities were launched. 
5.5 General conclusions 
1. What are the causes and main factors of conflict dynamics in agricultural and 
pastoral societies in Mali? 
The first factor of these dynamics relates to ecological disturbances in the Sahel region, namely to 
climate  and  vegetation  issues.  In years  of abundance  for  example, very  few  conflicts  emerge 
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between the different production systems. Plentiful resources also contribute to better relations 
between ethnic groups around socio-cultural activities. In such periods however, intra-ethnic 
conflicts between farmers are frequent because of quarrels about lands abandoned long before and 
which are now used for other purposes. 
In years of average harvests, increased competition about available resources constitutes a factor 
exacerbating the dynamics of intra- and inter-group conflicts where some groups are able to prevent 
other groups from accessing vital resources. This phenomenon is of particular gravity for groups of 
pastoralists who lose their lands to farmers and often express their frustration by violent means in 
the Sahel region, as was shown previously. 
In years of drought, severe difficulties affect almost all production systems. Major competition 
between the different actors breaks out when survival is at stake. According to the Centre for 
Ecological Monitoring of Western Africa based in Dakar, Senegal, droughts in the Sahel 
region have followed a cyclical pattern over the last forty years. Since 1962, Mali was affected by 
five major disruptions of its ecosystem: in 1962, in 1970-73, in 1984-85, in 1992-93 and in 2002, 
each one lasting one to two years. The frequency of the phenomena is thus decennial. Most major 
social upheavals in the Sahel region were preceded by a drought period. Analysts therefore consider 
that each drought in Mali resulted in social conflicts at regional, or often even at national, level. 
2. The political options and judicial framework of land and conflict management 
Policies developed following a drought period focussed on subsistence agriculture to the detriment 
of other production systems. So far, Sahelian governments refused to recognise the economic 
importance and the ecological contribution of the pastoral sector. 
Decades of centralised state control have also deprived local communities and resource users of the 
responsibility to manage natural resources and conflicts over those resources. The formal judicial 
system which has replaced customary systems is both inappropriate and ineffective. Judicial systems 
in force tend to encourage winner-loser situations rather than consensus and in many cases, state 
authorities are more prone to apply legal texts to the letter than to search for more social justice. 
This approach opposes traditional systems which tend to focus on reconciliation rather than on 
retribution. Another difficulty stems from the fact that formal judicial procedures are often 
inaccessible to the majority of the population because of their complexity, cost and frequent 
corruption among officials. 
Example: An investigation we held in the Diéma cercle revealed that over the period of 2004-2006, 
almost 50 millions CFA Francs had been invested in schools and health facilities by the communities 
and that an equivalent sum had been used over the previous three years to bribe officials. 
In Mali however, the situation is more promising now than it was a decade ago. The number of 
community-based organisations representing civil society is increasing and they have gained 
legitimacy. While these organisations remain weak in institutional terms, government initiatives 
aiming at a greater decentralisation as well as the adoption of important reforms, such as a legal 
code on property and state-owned lands and a pastoral charter, have enabled these civil society 
organisations to negotiate with state authorities and to contribute to reforms regarding the 
livelihood and means of subsistence of the local population. The challenge is now to provide these 
groups with competencies enabling them to benefit from these opportunities. 
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3. The transformation of production systems and the evolution of agro-pastoral societies 
Long lasting droughts have led to a continual decrease in specialisation. Specialised farmers and 
shepherds are now exceptions. Often, both activities are exercised on the same parcel, which leads 
to the erosion of complementary relations that favoured their mutual interdependence and 
sensibility for their respective difficulties during certain periods of the year. 
Example: Contracts of exchange of dung for leftovers from the harvest or barter of milk and meat for 
cereals… This was a characteristic of relationships between agriculture and livestock farming. 
Moreover, agriculture in the Sahel region becomes more extensive through the introduction of 
mechanisation. Large areas of deforested lands have reduced the number of usable land and the 
competition between production systems have often led to the degradation of the natural 
environment. At the same time, farming has kept its traditional characteristics and its space has 
become more and more restricted, which goes against its need for mobility in the Sahelian context. 
4. Multi-dimensional forces and consequences of neighbouring crises 
Nowadays, we witness an increase in the frequency and intensity of conflicts between different 
groups of users regarding lands and other resources. These can not be attributed solely to legal 
frameworks, climate or social change. They are also caused by international, multi-dimensional 
forces which the populations don’t understand or over which they have little control. In the case of 
Malian Western Sahel, the numerous refugees displaced by the crisis between Senegal and 
Mauritania in 1987 who found shelter in the Sahel region led to increased pressure and competition 
regarding access to natural resources. Moreover, the implication of Sahelian expatriates in central 
Africa, Europe or the United States promoting solely the interests of their respective communities 
have often contributed to exacerbate the conflicts and make the search for local solutions more 
difficult. A last element aggravating tensions and intensifying violence is the large availability of 
automatic weapons, primarily in the border areas. 
5. Who are the actors or groups of actors involved in the conflicts and what are their 
interests and their power relations? 
In the case of Malian Western Sahel, we can distinguish between three groups of actors: 
• Natives: farmers and stock breeders, residents working in different sectors, state 
representatives. 
• Foreign-born temporary residents: transhumance shepherds, refugees and other non-
residents. 
• International actors: expatriates, relatives and allies with whom the refugees have 
maintained contacts. 
The natives’ primary aim is to affirm their rights as original residents or exclusive land owners 
(state). 
The foreign-born legitimate their claims by their protected status (refugees) or by their status as 
nationals, yet not natives to the region. 
The international actors’ objective is to support the community they claim to be representing. 
A distinction between these power relations needs however to be done when conflicts are taken on 
a jurisdictional level. In that case, the power balance switches in favour of the two latter groups 
because of their better predispositions to corrupt law official in order to win their trials. 
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6. What roles do the state and civil society play? 
In the case of the conflict in Malian Sahel, the state played an important role through the launch of 
the first peace initiatives based on the experience in the Far North in 1990-1991.12 The state 
succeeded in initiating dialogue through the establishment of a commission of good offices 
composed of experts, which managed to bring the conflicting parties to the negotiation table and 
have them sign inter-community peace agreements as well as to guarantee the security of the 
border areas by building fourteen security posts which are now supported by national and 
international development partners. The state then organised a round table on the development of 
the region bringing together international aid organisations, civil society and local actors. The 
participation of the population was essential at every level; if the initiatives came from the state, 
their approach was essentially societal, which enabled the organisations of civil society to identify 
with them. 
7. The role that international cooperation and development actors play or should play 
International cooperation has been present at the request of the government since the first 
initiatives in the conflict. International cooperation and development actors have made contributions 
to various activities ranging from the phases of negotiation of the peace agreements to the launch of 
the recovery plan to counter economic disparities, based on the discussions of the round-table for 
the development of the Sahel region. In that regard, an inter-ministerial commission was established 
in order to evaluate the recovery plan, which is mainly funded by international donors, nationals and 
the state itself. 
An important effort by international cooperation actors is however requested in the fields of 
advocacy/lobbying activities in order to better adjust state policies to local specificities, but also - 
and perhaps more importantly - in terms of funding of local development. 
8. Lessons learnt from our experience in the Sahel region 
It is necessary to clarify the rights and obligations of the various users of natural resources, to 
provide local populations with the competences to negotiate agreements with other groups and with 
the government, to set up modern institutional dispositions for better negotiations and conflict 
management and to ensure that the negotiated solutions are confirmed on a legal level.  
The capacity of local actors to engage in constructive debates about legal texts governing their daily 
lives before their adoption by the national parliament is essential in order to guarantee a better 
adequacy and a respect of the policies regarding natural resources management. The state’s role 
would lie in the definition of a general framework, leaving the concrete implementation to local 
authorities in charge of regulations and social stability. 
The current context of decentralisation offers an opportunity to seek endogenous solutions through 
a participatory, inclusive approach involving all relevant actors, even the weakest ones (such as 
livestock breeders, women or youth). 
The balance of the relationships between the different production systems with regards to access 
and control of agricultural, pastoral and forest areas is an important condition for long-term peace in 
the Sahel region. Changes in the balance of power from a year to the next or between groups are a 
typical  feature  of  the  relationships   between  the  different  systems  of  production.  The situation 
 
______________________ 
12  Arab-Berber armed conflicts opposing Tuareg and the Malian state. 
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becomes however dangerous if one group manages, on the basis of endogenous or exogenous 
factors, to exclude another group completely from accessing vital natural resources. 
Helvetas-Mali’s programme on the prevention and management of conflicts linked to the access and 
control of agricultural, pastoral and forest areas has been in line with this logic of intervention since 
2003. The programme has contributed to the establishment of a conflict prevention and 
management mechanism through the support of consultation dynamics in the field of management 
of agricultural, pastoral and forest areas. The start of the process of transfer of competences to 
decentralised authorities in terms of natural resource management is a great opportunity. The 
programme focuses today on the empowerment of community-based organisations, so that they can 
benefit from the opportunities the ongoing reforms are offering them; we are convinced that 
disorganised, under-informed and vulnerable populations cannot benefit from such opportunities. 
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6 Switzerland, the UN and Environmental 
Peacebuilding 
Peter Maurer13 
 
Despite a wide range of academic research on environmental peacebuilding, not much has been 
done so far to assess how the UN could improve its action in this field and on how member states 
could assist in raising awarness for this complex issue. 
My first remark would be that, while sustainable development is a broadly used and quite clearly 
defined concept, this is not yet the case with environmental peacebuilding. I will therefore start by 
outlining trends in the area of environment and peacebuilding respectively which should then allow 
me to highlight the intersections of both. 
6.1 Trends in the area of environment 
The Rio Conference has triggered the development of a broad range of policies, norms and 
institutions. More than 30 multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) have been negotiated to 
date. There is a rising number of conferences of parties, secretariats, expert panels and funds which 
are linked to the UN. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is a very 
prominent example. The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) according to its mandate is the 
environmental pillar of the UN system, while the UN Environment Management Group (EMG) with 
its 44 participating units serves as an indicator for sprawling environment activities of the global 
MEAs, the UN specialised agencies, the Funds and Programmes and different units of the UN 
Secretariat. 
Cooperation between the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and UNEP has become the core of 
environmental operational activities at the field level. Similarly, the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) helped by providing grants to developing countries for projects relevant to global 
environmental protection such as biodiversity, climate change, organic pollutants, deforestation, 
land degradation, international waters and ozone. And while the Bali Strategic Plan remains the key 
document for country specific capacity-building on the environment, regional development banks 
have played a crucial role in the financing of environment activities at national and regional levels. 
The term “UN environmental pillar” suggests thematic unity. Nevertheless, the environment as a 
political agenda falls hostage to the approaches and sensitivities behind which different groups of 
states gather. And although there is a growing awareness for the interlinkages between sustainable 
resource management and development, only few admit a direct connection between environment 
challenges and the prevention of conflict. Thus, the current debate on environmental security and 
peacebuilding remains an often fragmented, uncoordinated and sometimes even ideological debate 
over issues such as state sovereignty, good governance and technology transfer. 
6.2 Trends in the area of peace and security 
The UN has developed a considerable number of new peace and security tools over the past 15 
years. Today, the biggest budgets are allocated to peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding and 
humanitarian aid. The UN is currently conducting 17 peacekeeping missions and 11 political 
missions in key zones of conflict. Once the Hybrid Mission in Darfur will be in place, there will be 
over 140’000 persons engaged in UN peacekeeping and the budget will rise to over 7 billion USD per 
year. 
 
______________________ 
13  Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations in New York. 
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Although most funds are still spent on reaction, important developments have taken place in areas 
of prevention and mediation. The recognition of the responsibility to protect in the 2005 Millennium 
Summit + 5 Outcome Document constitutes a milestone at the conceptual as well as systemic level. 
At the institutional level, the creation of a new UN Peacebuilding Commission as well as the 
Mediation Support and Rule of Law Units have helped to strengthen the preventive capacity of the 
UN. A more systematic collaboration between the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) 
at UNDP and the Department for Political Affairs within the Framework Team has increased 
synergies and information sharing. Moreover, research and policy shaping has led to the creation of 
new tools in complex and multidisciplinary areas such as Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration, Security Sector Reform or Transitional Justice. 
6.3 Overcoming the silo approach 
Although terms like “mainstreaming” and “crosscutting” are gaining popularity, the UN agenda is 
still shaped along traditional chapters such as Peace and Security, Economic and Social 
Development, Human Rights and Humanitarian Assistance. Environmental issues are rarely framed 
as relating or even contributing to economic development, even less as contributors to peace and 
security. In other words: while both pillars, environment and security, have shown dynamic 
evolutions, the focus on linkages between them is far less pronounced than the nexus between 
environment and development. 
There have, however, been important developments. In 2007 the Security Council held four open 
debates on various aspects of conflict prevention. Two of these discussions were concerned with 
environmental issues: the UK led a debate on security aspects of climate change while Belgium 
initiated an open discussion on natural resources and conflict. Both events confirmed that natural 
resources play a substantial role in armed conflicts and that the Security Council should take more 
preventive action in this field. Both debates highlighted a lack of conceptual clarity and expertise on 
relevant issues such as border disputes, migration, management of natural resources and energy 
supplies, or natural resource control regimes and sanctions regimes. 
Environmental peacebuilding gained further momentum from the environmental and developmental 
oriented Funds and Programmes in particular in the context of the debate on climate change. It has 
become a generally accepted assumption that climate change will seriously impact on vital resources 
- especially on agricultural land and freshwater - and thus not only jeopardize the prospect of 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals but also fuel new and potentially wide-spread 
conflicts. The Environmental Risk project of UNEP and analyses undertaken by the private sector 
have confirmed and detailed some of the earlier findings. Vulnerability and risk analysis made clear 
that environmental degradation and natural disaster have the potential to destabilize countries or 
entire regions if they are coupled with economic and social underdevelopment. 
6.4 New Trends 
While the debate is still new in UN fora, some important trends are recognizable - most in the form 
of good ideas but some also include first and concrete steps forward. There are several levels at 
which this question needs to be addressed: (i) conceptual level; (ii) operational level; (iii) governance 
level; (iv) information sharing and knowledge management; (v) instruments and (vi) partnerships.  
From a conceptual angle, there is a clear need for a political agenda which goes beyond the mere 
recognition that environment and conflict are interlinked. In this sense, the study “Linking 
Environment and Conflict  Prevention: The  Role  of  the  United Nations” is  a first step  in  the  right 
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direction14. The authors, based at the Centre for Security Studies (CSS) and swisspeace, differentiate 
between three different types of environment-related conflicts. Firstly, there is the so called 
“resource curse” where the commercial use of locally abundant but globally scarce resources such 
as oil and diamonds lead to armed conflict. Secondly, there are conflicts related to “local and 
regional resource scarcity”, namely in subsistance economies if vital resources such as water and 
land are insufficiently available or if there is no equitable access to them. Thirdly, there are the 
“conflict hot spots”, where both elements are at work. The study proves that grouping environment 
related conflicts into different categories makes it easier to identify the right set of measures to 
address a specific situation. 
Also, there have been some developments at the operational level. A prominent theme is the current 
debate over how best to respond to climate change. In this context, the adaptation, mitigation, 
technology and finance agendas have significantly evolved over the past year. The current discussion 
on how to reduce the adverse impact of climate change is particularly relevant for peacebuilding and 
sustainable development. Early warning systems and the increase in disaster and conflict 
preparedness play a crucial role. The need for operational plans for environmental refugees is also 
being addressed. In that context it is particularly relevant to understand how the international peace 
and security machinery should be capacitated to respond to various environmental dimensions of 
conflict. How can peace expertise enrich environmental work and environmental expertise support 
peacebuilding initiatives? 
The call for stronger institutions as well as for more cooperation and coordination has become a 
widely accepted priciple in discussions over international environmental governance. But 
environmental governance still lacks key building blocks such as scientific assessment capacity, 
coordination and cooperation schemes, finance and related mechanisms as well as regional and 
national capacity. In that sense it is encouraging to see that the Peacebuilding Commission is just 
starting to include environmental dimensions into national peacebuidling strategies and that UNDP 
and UNEP are beginning to formalize agreements on how to enhance cooperation at the country 
level. 
Moreover, the ongoing reform of system-wide coherence of the UN family and the plan to “deliver 
as one” are further important entry points to integrated development, security and environmental 
approaches. The High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence in the areas of Development, 
Humanitarian Assistance, and Environment, the informal consultations of the General Assembly on 
environment and the recent debates in the Governing Council have all supported the conclusion that 
UNEP should be upgraded with a renewed mandate and improved funding and that the Global 
Environment Facility should be strengthened. In short, there is a clear signal from the part of UN 
Member States to address International Environmental Governance (IEG) reform. 
On the other hand, not much has been done so far to improve information sharing and knowledge 
management in the area of environment and conflict. Current initiatives to develop new information 
technology schemes either focus on peacebuilding or on environment, but seldom contain a 
authoritative overview of existing best practice or lessons learnt on environment related conflict 
prevention. 
While existing lessons from the field clearly indicate that there are no quick fixes and no one-fits-all 
solutions at the operational level, there are still important gaps with regard to working instruments 
and tool-kits, such  as mediation  guidelines for resource sharing, training modules on environmental  
 
______________________ 
14  See Mason, Simon A., Albrecht Schnabel, Adrian Müller, Rina Alluri, Christian Schmid. 2008. Linking Environment and 
Conflict Prevention: The Role of the United Nations. Zurich: CSS; Berne: swisspeace. 
http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/publications_by_staff/UNstudy_Long-June-2008_FH.pdf 
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diplomacy, interactive information management tools; environmental indicators for peace-building 
strategies, specific sanctions regimes and guidelines to improve environmental sensitivity of 
peacekeeping missions, development and scaling up of positive experiences like the Extractive 
Industry Initiative or natural resource certification schemes like the Kimberley process. 
Finally, a lot of potential also lies at the level of global partnerships. Since its creation in 2000 the 
UN Global Compact has fostered recognition for the significant role the private sector plays in the 
areas of sustainable development and conflict prevention. Its commonly adopted standards have a 
strong focus on human rights, labour standards, environmental protection and corruption. The 
political relevance of this initiative for environmental peacebuilding was underlined at the Global 
Compact Leaders Summit 2007 at Geneva, where climate change and environmental governance 
figured prominently on the conference agenda. One of the adopted recommendations stressed the 
importance that companies set aggressive and precise targets and make a business case of 
environmental sustainability to stimulate best practices. 
6.5 Strengths and weaknesses of the UN 
The strenghts and the weaknesses of the UN are very straightforward and a list of advantages and 
disadvantages can be compiled as follows: 
On the one hand, the UN is well suited to deal with issues of environmental security for the 
following reasons: it comprises 60 years of accumulated knowledge and experience in the relevant 
fields; it has the political legitimacy to enact general norms and codices; its membership is universal; 
its funds and programmes cover the whole spectrum of relevant experience and operational 
expertise at field level; it generates finance through assessed as well as voluntary contributions; its 
political and institutional structure provides a unique basis for integrated approaches. 
On the other hand, the size and complexity of the UN results in a high degree of fragmentation and 
bureaucratization. In spite of a relatively high degree of institutional independence of the Special 
Organisations and Funds and Programmes each entity remains state driven whereby a top-down 
approach prevails. 
Although the Security Council bears the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and 
security, its main focus has traditionally been on managing already existing conflicts. This was due 
to the unwillingness of some Council Members to get involved in internal conflicts. Discussing issues 
of environmental security in the Council is even more difficult, as many members of the UN fear an 
encroachment over social and economic issues which do not fall under the authority of the council, 
or see their sovereignty over their natural resources threatened. 
But as already mentioned, recent debates have shown that more preventive action from the Security 
Council is needed and that natural resources and their sustainable management play an important 
role in conflict prevention. However, it also became clear that there is a lack of expertise within the 
Council and not enough advise from the Secretariat on issues of environmental peacemaking and 
peacebuilding. 
One lesson the Secretary-General drew was that the preventive capacity of the UN Secretariat has to 
be strengthened. This includes the need to enhance its capacity to address natural resource 
management early in a peace process and to include environmental aspects in post-conflict 
peacebuilding. 
While the strengthening of the Secretariat is probably the least controversial among outstanding 
reform issues, improving systemic coherence between conflict prevention and environmental 
protection is a far bigger and much more complex challenge. Even more so, as we are dealing here 
with a typical cross-cutting issue with a high degree of political sensitivity. 
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The creation of a new entity within the UN will not solve the problem. On the contrary, the 
experience from establishing a new peacebuilding architecture has shown that the creation of new 
entities without a prior conceptual definition leads to resource problems, parallelisms and 
competitions. 
Similarly, a recently emerging consensus indicates that the current structure of international 
environmental governance and the governance for sustainable development do not have the 
capacity to face the growing environmental challenges. Despite this recognition, however, the main 
area of disagreement remains how to address these problems. The need to strengthen the 
environmental pillar by upgrading UNEP into a United Nations Environment Organisation (UNEO) 
has repeatedly been underlined. Still, a considerable number of UN members doubt whether a 
specialized agency for the environment will solve the systemic problems of the current system. Yet, 
there is a growing convergence of opinions that the environmental pillar within the UN is 
underrepresented in terms of political status and that it needs to be strengthened. 
6.6 What role can Switzerland play? 
Being a Member State of the UN Switzerland can do two things: reinforce the strenghts and adress 
the weaknesses of the Organisation. There are different means by which it can engage at the 
political as well as at the operational level. 
At the political level, Switzerland should ensure its own coordinated approach in all key 
intergovernmental fora: the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and its related 
Commissions, the Security Council, the Peacebuilding Commission, the specialized Funds, Agencies 
and Programmes, and Conferences of Parties to Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Switzerland 
should furthermore engage for stronger governance on cross-cutting issues whenever they are the 
content of UN Resolutions. It can attempt to shape Presidential Statements of the Security Council 
by helping to clarify concepts and identify possible lines of action. 
At a more operational level Switzerland should try to win the support of less and least developed 
countries for a new narrative on environment related poverty reduction and peacebuilding. It should 
raise awareness for the problematic by systematically highlighting economic advantages of and 
stability gains from environmental protection. This could be done, for example, through the 
financing of innovative pioneer projects, the mandating of authoritative assessments or by investing 
in tools, training and information technology-based knowledge management systems. 
I should like to conclude by underlining that conflict prevention, peacebuilding, environmental 
security are relatively new and above all knowledge-intensive and multidisciplinary issues. Combined 
expertise is therefore necessary to develop practical solutions. Switzerland must continue its close 
collaboration with academic institutions and think tanks to explore new niches and instruments. It 
should also provide - whenever possible - this expertise to the UN. 
The Study “Linking Environment and Conflict Prevention - The role of the UN” mandated by the 
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and conducted in cooperation with swisspeace and ETH/CSS 
provides a first basis for a more informed examination of how Switzerland can help to improve UN 
response to environmental security issues. 
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